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Abstract
We develop a model of the gambler’s fallacy – the mistaken belief that random
sequences should exhibit systematic reversals. We show that an individual who holds
this belief and observes a sequence of signals can exaggerate the magnitude of changes
in an underlying state but underestimate their duration. When the state is constant,
and so signals are i.i.d., the individual can predict that long streaks of similar signals
will continue – a hot-hand fallacy. When signals are serially correlated, the individual
typically under-reacts to short streaks, over-reacts to longer ones, and under-reacts to
very long ones. We explore several applications, showing, for example, that investors
may move assets too much in and out of mutual funds, and exaggerate the value of
financial information and expertise.
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1 Introduction
Many people fall under the spell of the “gambler’s fallacy,” expecting outcomes in random
sequences to exhibit systematic reversals. When observing flips of a fair coin, for example,
people believe that a streak of heads makes it more likely that the next flip will be a tail.
The gambler’s fallacy is commonly interpreted as deriving from a fallacious belief in the
“law of small numbers” or “local representativeness,” namely that a small sample should
resemble closely the underlying population. For example, people seem to believe that heads
and tails should balance even in small samples. On the other hand, people also sometimes
predict that random sequences will exhibit excessive persistence rather than reversals. While
several studies have shown the belief to be fallacious, basketball fans believe that players
have “hot hands,” being more likely than average to make the next shot when currently on
a hot streak.1
At first blush, the hot-hand fallacy appears to directly contradict the gambler’s fallacy
because it involves belief in excessive persistence rather than reversals. Several researchers
have, however, suggested that the two fallacies might be related, with the hot-hand fallacy
arising as a consequence of the gambler’s fallacy.2 Consider an investor who believes that the
performance of a mutual fund is a combination of the manager’s ability and luck. Convinced
that luck should revert, the investor underestimates the likelihood that a manager of average
ability will exhibit a streak of above- or below-average performances. Following good or bad
streaks, therefore, the investor will over-infer that the current manager is above or below
average, and so in turn will predict continuation of unusual performances.
This paper develops a model to examine the link between the gambler’s fallacy and the
hot-hand fallacy, as well as the broader implications of the fallacies for people’s predictions
and actions in economic and financial settings. In our model, an individual observes a
sequence of signals that depend on an unobservable underlying state. We show that because
1The representativeness bias is perhaps the most commonly explored bias in judgment research. Section
2 reviews evidence on the gambler’s fallacy, and a more extensive review can be found in Rabin (2002). For
evidence on the hot-hand fallacy see, for example, Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky (1985) and Tversky and
Gilovich (1989a, 1989b). See also Camerer (1989) who shows that betting markets for basketball games
exhibit a small hot-hand bias.
2See, for example, Camerer (1989) and Rabin (2002). The causal link between the gambler’s fallacy and
the hot-hand fallacy is a common intuition in psychology. Some suggestive evidence comes from an exper-
iment by Edwards (1961) in which subjects observe a very long binary series and are given no information
about the generating process. Subjects seem, by the evolution of their predictions over time, to come to
believe in a hot hand. Since the actual generating process is i.i.d., this is suggestive that a source of the hot
hand is the perception of too many long streaks.
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of the gambler’s fallacy, the individual is prone to exaggerate the magnitude of changes in
the state, but underestimate their duration. We characterize the individual’s predictions
following streaks of similar signals, and determine when a hot-hand fallacy can arise. We
study two applications to investor behavior: the movement of assets in and out of mutual
funds, and the investors’ willingness to pay for financial information.
While providing extensive motivation and elaboration in Section 2, our full model is
presented here. An individual observes a sequence of signals whose probability distribution
depends on an underlying state. The signal st in Period t = 1, 2, .. is
st = θt + ²t, (1)
where θt is the state and ²t an i.i.d. normal shock with mean zero and variance σ
2
² > 0. The
state evolves according to the auto-regressive process
θt = µ+ ρ(θt−1 − µ) + ηt, (2)
where µ is the long-run mean, ρ ∈ [0, 1) the persistence parameter, and ηt an i.i.d. normal
shock with mean zero, variance σ2η, and independent of ²t. As an example that we shall
return to often, consider a mutual fund run by a team of managers. We interpret the signal
as the fund’s return, the state as the managers’ average ability, and the shock ²t as the
managers’ luck. Assuming that the ability of any given manager is constant over time, we
interpret 1− ρ as the rate of managerial turnover, and σ2η as the dispersion in ability across
managers.
We model the gambler’s fallacy as the mistaken belief that the sequence {²t}t≥1 is not
i.i.d., but rather exhibits reversals: according to the individual,
²t = ωt − αρ
∞∑
k=0
δkρ²t−1−k, (3)
where the sequence {ωt}t≥1 is i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance σ2ω, αρ ≡ αρ,
and δρ ≡ δρ, for some α, δ ∈ [0, 1).3 Intuitively, consistent with the gambler’s fallacy, the
individual believes that high realizations of ²t′ in Period t
′ < t make a low realization more
likely in Period t. The parameter αρ ∈ [0, 1) measures the strength of the effect, while
3We set ²t = 0 for t ≤ 0, so that all terms in the infinite sum are well defined.
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δρ ∈ [0, 1) measures the relative influence of realizations in the recent and more distant
past. We assume that (αρ, δρ) are linear functions of ρ. Our motivation for doing so is our
interpretation of ρ combined with the notion that people expect a small sample to resemble
closely the underlying population only when all elements in the sample are drawn from the
same intrinsic distribution. This is the case, for example, for the sample of performances
of a fund manager whose ability is constant over time. But we assume that people do
not structure the world as demanding forms of mean reversion across distributions; a good
performance by one manager, for example, does not make another manager due for a bad
performance next month. If managers turn over frequently (i.e., ρ is small) therefore, the
gambler’s fallacy has a small effect.4 We develop and motivate these foundations in greater
detail in Section 2. For expositional ease, from now on we follow the convention in the
literature of referring to an individual subject to the gambler’s fallacy (α > 0) as “Freddy,”
and to a Bayesian (α = 0) as “Tommy.”5
In Section 3 we examine how Freddy uses the sequence of past signals to make inferences
about the underlying parameters and to predict future signals. We assume that Freddy infers
as a fully rational Bayesian and fully understands the structure of his environment, except
for a mistaken and dogmatic belief that α > 0. From observing the signals, Freddy infers
both the underlying state θt and the values of any parameters of his model (i.e., σ
2
η, ρ, σ
2
ω, µ)
about which he is uncertain.
When Freddy is certain about all model parameters, his inference about unobservable
variables can be treated using standard tools of recursive (Kalman) filtering, where the
gambler’s fallacy essentially expands the state vector to include not only the state θt but also
a statistic of past luck realizations. When Freddy is uncertain about parameters, recursive
filtering can be used to evaluate the likelihood of signals conditional on parameters. An
appropriate version of the law of large numbers then implies that after observing many
signals, Freddy converges with probability one to parameter values that maximize a limit
likelihood. While the maximum likelihood when α = 0 leads Tommy to limit posteriors
corresponding to the true parameter values, Freddy’s abiding belief that α > 0 leads him
generally to false limit posteriors. Identifying when and how these limit beliefs are wrong is
the crux of our analysis.
4An earlier version of this paper (Rabin and Vayanos (2005)) assumes that (αρ, δρ) are independent of ρ,
and derives results of a similar flavor as long as δρ < ρ.
5Freddy made his first appearance in Rabin (2002)’s model of the law of small numbers. We relate our
work to Rabin in Section 2.
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In Section 4 we consider the case where signals are i.i.d. This case can arise either because
σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0, e.g., there is either no variance in managerial ability or all managers are
replaced by new ones in each period. If Freddy is initially uncertain about the values of all
parameters, then irrespective of whether σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0, he converges to the belief that
ρ = 0. Under this belief he predicts the signals correctly as i.i.d., despite the gambler’s
fallacy. The intuition is that he views each signal as drawn by a new distribution, e.g.,
new managers run the fund in each period. Therefore, his belief that any given manager’s
performance should average out over multiple periods has no effect.
We next assume that Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ > 0, e.g., he is aware that
managers stay in the fund for more than one period. This case is consistent with signals
being i.i.d. as long as σ2η = 0. Ironically, Freddy is worse off with prior knowledge because
he cannot converge to the belief ρ = 0, which, while incorrect, enables him to predict the
signals correctly. Instead, he converges to the smallest value of ρ to which he gives positive
probability. He also converges to a positive value of σ2η, believing falsely that managers differ
in ability, so that (given turnover) there is variation over time in average ability. This belief
helps him explain the incidence of streaks despite the gambler’s fallacy: a streak of high
returns, for example, can be readily explained through the belief that good managers might
have joined the fund recently. Of course, Freddy thinks the streak might also have been due
to luck, and expects a reversal. We show that the expectation of a reversal dominates for
short streaks, but because reversals that do not happen make Freddy more confident the
managers have improved, he expects long streaks to continue.
In Section 5 we consider the case where signals are serially correlated. As in the i.i.d. case,
Freddy underestimates ρ and overestimates σ2η. He does not converge, however, all the way
to ρ = 0 because he must account for the signals’ serial correlation. Because he views shocks
to the state as overly large in magnitude (large σ2η), he treats signals as very informative,
and tends to over-react to streaks. For very long streaks, however, there is under-reaction
because Freddy’s underestimation of ρ means that he views the information learned from
the signals as overly short-lived. Under-reaction also tends to occur following short streaks
because of the basic gambler’s fallacy intuition – Freddy expects luck to reverse.
In summary, Sections 4 and 5 confirm the oft-conjectured link from the gambler’s to the
hot-hand fallacy and generate additional predictions. We show that the hot-hand fallacy
can arise in i.i.d. settings if individuals attribute non-zero prior probability that the state
is time-varying (σ2η > 0). Moreover, if the fallacy arises, it does so following long streaks.
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The hot-hand fallacy always arises in non-i.i.d. settings, in the form of over-reaction relative
to the rational benchmark. Over-reaction occurs following long streaks, but there is under-
reaction for very long streaks and possibly for short ones as well.
We conclude this paper in Section 6 by exploring the implications of our model for finan-
cial decisions. We interpret signals as financial returns, and assume that Freddy allocates
wealth between a risky and a riskless asset under CARA preferences. A first application
concerns Freddy’s trading activity. When returns are i.i.d. and Freddy has prior knowledge
that ρ is bounded away from zero, he ends up believing in predictability. This false belief
can lead Freddy to trade, unlike Tommy who recognizes that there is no predictability. More
surprisingly, over-trading can also occur when there is true predictability and Freddy has no
prior knowledge. The intuition is that Freddy views signals as overly informative about the
state but treats the information as short-lived. Thus, his response to news is to make a large
trade and reverse it shortly afterwards. These results could be relevant for understanding
the large trading volume in actual markets and the large flows in and out of mutual funds.
A second application concerns the willingness to pay for financial information. Because
Freddy can end up believing in predictability even in i.i.d. settings, he can overpay for
information on past returns. He can also exaggerate the value of financial experts if he
believes that the experts’ advantage is to observe past returns. This could help explain
why people invest in actively-managed funds in spite of the evidence that these funds do not
outperform their market benchmarks. In Section 6 we argue that our model could also speak
to other finance puzzles such as the equity-premium puzzle and the presence of momentum
and reversals in stock returns.
2 The Model
Our model is fully described by Eqs. (1) to (3) presented in the Introduction. In this section
we motivate the model by drawing the connection with the experimental evidence on the
gambler’s fallacy. A difficulty with using this evidence is that most experiments concern
sequences that are both binary and i.i.d., such as coin flips. Our goal, by contrast, is to ex-
plore the implications of the gambler’s fallacy in richer settings. Indeed, since our prediction
is that Freddy will always come to believe the world is non-i.i.d., a theory of his beliefs in
this perceived setting is essential. The experimental evidence gives little direct guidance as
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to how the gambler’s fallacy would manifest itself in non-binary, non-i.i.d. settings. In this
section, however, we make the case that our model represents a natural extrapolation of the
“logic” underlying the behavior of the experimental subjects to richer settings. Of course,
any such extrapolation has an element of arbitrariness to it. But, if nothing else, our speci-
fication of the gambler’s fallacy in the new settings can be viewed as a working hypothesis
about the broader empirical nature of the phenomenon that both highlights features of the
phenomenon that seem to matter and generates testable predictions for experimental and
field research.
Experiments documenting the gambler’s fallacy are mainly of three types: production
tasks, where subjects are asked to produce sequences that look to them like random sequences
of coin flips, recognition tasks, where subjects are asked to identify which sequences look like
coin flips, and prediction tasks, where subjects are asked to predict the next outcome in
coin-flip sequences. In all types of experiments, the typical subject identifies a switching
(i.e., reversal) rate greater than 50% as indicative of random coin flips.6 The most carefully
reported data for our purposes comes from the production-task study of Rapoport and
Budescu (1997). Using their Table 7, we estimate in Table 1 below the subjects’ assessed
probability that the next flip of a coin will be heads given the last three flips.7
According to Table 1, the average effect of changing the most recent flip from heads
(H) to tails (T) is to raise the probability that the next flip will be H from 40.2% (=
30.1%+38.1%+41.1%+51.5%
4
) to 59.8%, i.e., an increase of 19.6%. This corresponds well to the
6See Bar-Hillel and Wagenaar (1991) for a review of the literature, and Rapoport and Budescu (1992,1997)
and Budescu and Rapoport (1994) for more recent studies. The experimental evidence has some shortcom-
ings. For example, most prediction-task studies report the fraction of subjects predicting a switch but not
the subjects’ assessed probability of a switch. Thus, it could be that the vast majority of subjects predict a
switch, and yet their assessed probability is only marginally larger than 50%. Even worse, the probability
could be exactly 50%, since under that probability subjects are indifferent as to their prediction.
Some prediction-task studies attempt to measure assessed probabilities more accurately. For example,
Gold and Hester (1987) find evidence in support of the gambler’s fallacy in settings where subjects are
given a choice between a sure payoff and a random payoff contingent on a specific coin outcome. Supporting
evidence also comes from settings outside the laboratory. For example, Clotfelter and Cook (1993) and Terrell
(1994) study pari-mutuel lotteries, where the winnings from a number are shared among all people betting
on that number. They find that people avoid systematically to bet on numbers that won recently. This is a
strict mistake because the numbers with the fewest bets are those with the largest expected winnings.
7Rapoport and Budescu report occurrences of short sequences of heads (H) and tails (T) within the
larger sequences (of 150 elements) produced by the subjects. To translate these occurrences into conditional
probabilities, we use relative frequencies: for example, we estimate the probability of H conditional on the
sequence HHH as the ratio of occurrences of HHHH to the sum of occurrences of HHHH and HHHT. This
represents the fraction of the time that subjects chose to repeat H after HHH. We believe that this fraction
is a good measure of the subjects’ assessed probability: for example, a subject believing that HHH should
be followed by H with 40% probability could be choosing H after HHH 40% of the time when constructing
a random sequence.
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3rd-to-last 2nd-to-last Very last Prob. next will be H (%)
H H H 30.1
T H H 38.1
H T H 41.1
H H T 48.5
H T T 61.9
T H T 58.9
T T H 51.5
T T T 69.9
Table 1: Assessed probability that the next flip of a coin will be heads (H) given the last
three flips being heads or tails (T). Based on Rapoport and Budescu (1997), Table 7, p. 613.
general stylized fact in the literature that subjects tend to view randomness in coin-flip
sequences as corresponding to a switching rate of 60% rather than 50%. Table 1 also shows
that the effect of the gambler’s fallacy is not limited to the most recent flip. For example, the
average effect of changing the second most recent flip from H to T is to raise the probability
of H from 43.9% to 56.1%, i.e., an increase of 12.2%. The average effect of changing the
third most recent flip from H to T is to raise the probability of H from 45.4% to 54.6%, i.e.,
an increase of 9.2%.
How would a believer in the gambler’s fallacy, exhibiting behavior such as in Table 1,
form predictions in non-binary, non-i.i.d. settings? Our extrapolation approach consists in
viewing the richer settings as combinations of coins. We first consider a setting that is non-
binary but i.i.d. Suppose that the signal Freddy is observing in each period is the sum of a
large number of independent coin flips, where we set H=1 and T=-1. For example, with 100
coins, Freddy is observing a signal between 100 and -100, and a signal of 10 means that 55
coins came H and 45 came T. Suppose that Freddy applies his gambler’s fallacy reasoning to
each of the coins, and his beliefs are as in Table 1. Then, after a signal of 10, he assumes that
the 55 H coins have probability 40.2% to come H again, while the 45 T coins have probability
59.8% to switch to H. Thus, he expects on average 40.2% × 55 + 59.8% × 45 = 49.02 coins
to come H, and this translates to an expectation of 49.02 − (100 − 49.02) = −1.96 for the
next signal.
The “multiple-coin” story shares many of our model’s key features. To explain why, we
specialize the model to i.i.d. signals, taking the state θt to be known and constant over time.
We generate a constant state by setting ρ = 1 and σ2η = 0 in (2). For simplicity, we also
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normalize the constant value of the state to zero. For ρ = 1, (3) becomes
²t = ωt − α
∞∑
k=0
δk²t−1−k. (4)
When the state is equal to zero, (1) becomes st = ²t. Substituting into (4) and taking
expectations conditional on Period t− 1, we find
Et−1(st) = −α
∞∑
k=0
δkst−1−k. (5)
Comparing (5) with the predictions of the multiple-coin story, we can calibrate the param-
eters (α, δ) and test our model specification. Suppose that st−1 = 10 and that signals in
prior periods are equal to their average of zero. Eq. (5) then implies that Et−1(st) = −10α.
According to the multiple-coin story Et−1(st) should be -1.96, which yields α = −0.196. To
calibrate δ, we repeat the exercise for st−2 and st−3. Using the data in Table 1, we find
αδ = −0.122 and αδ2 = −0.096. Thus, the decay in influence between the most and second
most recent signal is 0.122/0.196 = 0.62, while the decay between the second and third most
recent signal is 0.092/0.122 = 0.75. The two rates are not identical as our model assumes,
but are quite close. Thus, our geometric-decay specification seems reasonable, and we can
take α = 0.2 and δ = 0.7 as a plausible calibration. With the obvious caution that this
is based on the limited evidence of one experiment, we use these values as part of a more
general calibration exercise in Section 6.4.
Several other features of our specification deserve comment. One is normality: since ωt is
normal, (4) implies that the distribution of st = ²t conditional on Period t−1 is normal. The
multiple-coin story also generates approximate normality if we take the number of coins to
be large. A second feature is linearity: if we double st−1 in (5), holding other signals to zero,
then Et−1(st) doubles. The multiple-coin story shares this feature: a signal of 20 means that
60 coins came H and 40 came T, and this doubles the expectation of the next signal. A third
feature is additivity: according to (5), the effect of each signal on Et−1(st) is independent of
the other signals. Table 1 generates some support for additivity. For example, changing the
most recent flip from H to T increases the probability of H by 20.8% when the second and
third most recent flips are identical (HH or TT) and by 18.4% when they differ (HT or TH).
Thus, in this experiment the effect of the most recent flip depends only weakly on prior flips.
We next extend our approach to non-i.i.d. settings. Suppose that the signal Freddy
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is observing in each period is the sum of a large number of independent coin flips, but
where coins differ in their probabilities of H and T, and are replaced over time randomly
by new coins. Signals are thus serially correlated: they tend to be high at times where the
replacement process brings many new coins biased towards H, and vice-versa. If Freddy
applies his gambler’s fallacy reasoning to each individual coin, then this will generate a
gambler’s fallacy for the signals. The strength of the latter fallacy, however, depends on
the rate at which coins are replaced. If, for example, Freddy believes that replacement is
frequent, then his incorrect belief that the outcomes of a given coin should average out over
time has little effect.
To relate the above story to our model, we recast it in a setting with normal distribu-
tions. Consider a mutual fund that consists of a continuum with mass one of managers, and
suppose that a random fraction 1− ρ of managers are replaced by new ones in each period.
Suppose that the fund’s return st is an average of returns attributable to each manager, and
a manager’s return is the sum of ability and luck, both normally distributed. Ability is con-
stant over time for a given manager, while luck is i.i.d. Thus, a manager’s returns are i.i.d.
conditional on ability, and the manager can be viewed as a “coin” with the probability of
H and T corresponding to ability. To ensure that aggregate variables are stochastic despite
the continuum assumption, we assume that ability and luck are identical within the cohort
of managers who enter the fund in a given period.8
We next show that if Freddy applies his gambler’s fallacy reasoning to each manager,
per our specification (4) for i.i.d. settings, then this generates a gambler’s fallacy for fund
returns, per our specification (3) for non-i.i.d. settings. Defining ²t,t′ as the luck in Period t
of the cohort entering in Period t′ ≤ t, we can write (4) for a manager in that cohort as
²t,t′ = ωt,t′ − α
∞∑
k=0
δk²t−1−k,t′ , (6)
where {ωt,t′}t≥t′≥0 is an i.i.d. sequence, and ²t′′,t′ ≡ 0 for t′′ < t′. To aggregate (6) for the
fund, we note that in Period t the average luck ²t of all managers is
²t = (1− ρ)
∑
t′≤t
ρt−t
′
²t,t′ , (7)
8The intuition behind the example would be the same, but more plausible, with a single manager in each
period who is replaced by a new one with Poisson probability 1 − ρ. We assume a continuum because this
preserves normality. The assumption that all managers in a cohort have the same ability and luck can be
motivated in reference to the single-manager setting.
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since (1− ρ)ρt−t′ managers from the cohort entering in Period t′ are still in the fund. Com-
bining (6) and (7), we find
²t = ωt − αρ
∞∑
k=0
δkρ²t−1−k, (8)
for αρ ≡ αρ, δρ ≡ δρ, and the i.i.d. sequence ωt ≡ (1 − ρ)
∑
t′≤t ρ
t−t′ωt,t′ . Eq. (8) coincides
with (3), our specification of the gambler’s fallacy in non-i.i.d. settings. The difference
between (8) and its i.i.d. counterpart (4) is that the parameters (α, δ) of the gambler’s
fallacy are multiplied by ρ. Thus, the fallacy is weaker the larger managerial turnover is.
Intuitively, with large turnover, Freddy’s belief that a given manager’s performance should
average out over multiple periods has little effect.9
The model closest to ours, and from which we build, is Rabin’s (2002) model of the law
of small numbers. In Rabin, the signal is the color of a ball drawn from an urn. Balls are
drawn with replacement, but Freddy believes that the urn is replenished only every odd
period. Thus, he overestimates the probability that the ball drawn in an even period is of a
different color than the one drawn in the previous period.
The model employed here provides a broader framework with substantial additional struc-
ture, and addresses a wider range of questions. Besides eliminating the artificial distinction
between odd and even periods, which Rabin introduces to prevent the urn from running out
of balls, we assume continuous rather than binary signals, and move beyond i.i.d. settings
because we allow the state (urn type in Rabin) to vary over time. This makes our model
suitable for analyzing the hot-hand fallacy, which involves precisely a belief in the state’s
time-variation.10 Within our model we can also examine how frequently Freddy believes that
the state is changing, and many of our results are based on his overestimation of that fre-
quency. Finally, because of the time-varying state, learning in our model continues to occur
in a stochastic steady state, while learning eventually ceases in a constant-state model.
Because of the steady state and the normal-linear structure, our model is more tractable
and suitable for applications. For example, we can characterize fully Freddy’s predictions
9Our specification of the gambler’s fallacy becomes ambiguous in the special case where Freddy believes
that while managers turn over (ρ < 1), they are all of the same ability (σ2η = 0). In that case, he views
the returns of all managers as generated by a common distribution. Therefore, his fallacious belief on small
samples can apply equally plausibly to the common distribution as to the distribution of a single manager’s
returns. In other words, (8) is equally plausible for (α, δ) as for (αρ, δρ), i.e., ρ can be replaced by one. In
what follows we ignore this ambiguity since in almost all cases we consider Freddy entertains the possibility
that σ2η > 0, thus viewing different managers as potentially different distributions.
10Rabin shows a static cousin of the hot-hand fallacy called fictitious variation: Freddy overestimates the
cross-sectional dispersion in urn types.
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after streaks of signals, while Rabin can do so (with numerical examples) only for short
streaks. The Finance applications in Section 6 illustrate further our model’s tractability
and applicability. We show that quantities such as trading volume and value of information
can be computed easily, and we establish several novel results on how the gambler’s fallacy
influences these quantities.
3 Inference - General Results
In this section we formulate Freddy’s inference problem, and establish some general results
that serve as the basis for the more specific results of Sections 4-6. The inference problem
consists in using the signals to learn about the underlying state θt and possibly about the
parameters of the model. Freddy’s model is characterized by the variance σ2η of the shocks
to the state, the persistence ρ, the variance σ2ω of the shocks affecting the signal noise, the
long-run mean µ, and the parameters (α, δ) of the gambler’s fallacy. We assume that Freddy
does not question his belief in the gambler’s fallacy, i.e., has a dogmatic point prior on (α, δ).
He can, however, learn about the other parameters. From now on, we reserve the notation
(σ2η, ρ, σ
2
ω, µ) for the true parameter values, and denote generic values by (σ˜
2
η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜). Thus,
Freddy can learn about the parameter vector p˜ ≡ (σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜2ω, µ˜).
3.1 No Parameter Uncertainty
We start with the case where Freddy is certain that the parameter vector takes a specific
value p˜. This case is relatively simple and serves as an input for the parameter-uncertainty
case. Freddy’s inference problem can be formulated as one of recursive (Kalman) filtering.
Recursive filtering is a technique for solving inference problems where (i) inference concerns
a “state vector” evolving according to a stochastic process, (ii) a noisy signal of the state
vector is observed in each period, (iii) the stochastic structure is linear and normal.11
To formulate the recursive-filtering problem, we must define the state vector, the equation
according to which the state vector evolves, and the equation linking the state vector to the
signal. The state vector must include not only the state θt, but also some measure of the past
11For textbooks on recursive filtering see, for example, Anderson and Moore (1979) and Balakrishnan
(1987). We are using the somewhat cumbersome term “state vector” because we are reserving the term
“state” for θt, and the two concepts differ in our model.
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realizations of luck since according to Freddy luck reverses predictably. It turns out that
all past luck realizations can be condensed into an one-dimensional statistic. This statistic
can be appended to the state θt, and therefore, recursive filtering can be used even in the
presence of the gambler’s fallacy. We define the state vector as
xt ≡
[
θt − µ˜, ²δt
]′
,
where the statistic of past luck realizations is
²δt ≡
∞∑
k=0
δkρ˜²t−k,
and v′ denotes the transpose of the vector v. Eqs. (2) and (3) imply that the state vector
evolves according to
xt = A˜xt−1 + wt, (9)
where
A˜ ≡
[
ρ˜ 0
0 δρ˜ − αρ˜
]
and
wt ≡ [ηt, ωt]′.
Eqs. (1)-(3) imply that the signal is related to the state vector through
st = µ˜+ C˜xt−1 + vt, (10)
where
C˜ ≡ [ρ˜,−αρ˜]
and vt ≡ ηt+ωt. To start the recursion, we must specify Freddy’s prior beliefs for the initial
state x0. We denote the mean and variance of θ0 by θ0 and σ
2
θ,0, respectively. Since ²t = 0
for t ≤ 0, the mean and variance of ²δ0 are zero. Proposition 1 determines Freddy’s beliefs
about the state in Period t, conditional on the history of signals Ht ≡ {st′}t′=1,..,t up to that
period.
Proposition 1 Conditional on Ht, xt is normal with mean xt(p˜) given recursively by
xt(p˜) = A˜xt−1(p˜) + G˜t
[
st − µ˜− C˜xt−1(p˜)
]
, x0(p˜) = [θ0 − µ˜, 0]′, (11)
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and covariance matrix Σ˜t given recursively by
Σ˜t = A˜Σ˜t−1A˜′ −
[
C˜Σ˜t−1C˜ ′ + V˜
]
G˜tG˜
′
t + W˜ , Σ˜0 =
[
σ2θ,0 0
0 0
]
, (12)
where
G˜t ≡ 1
C˜Σ˜t−1C˜ ′ + V˜
[
A˜Σ˜t−1C˜ ′ + U˜
]
, (13)
V˜ ≡ E˜(v2t ), W˜ ≡ E˜(wtw′t), U˜ ≡ E˜(vtwt), and E˜ is Freddy’s expectation operator.
Freddy’s conditional expectation evolves according to (11). This is simply a regression
equation: the state vector in Period t is regressed on that period’s signal, conditional on the
history up to Period t − 1. The regression coefficient G˜t depends on Freddy’s conditional
variance of the state Σ˜t−1. Proposition 2 shows that when t goes to∞, this variance converges
to a limit that is independent of the initial value Σ˜0.
Proposition 2 Limt→∞Σ˜t = Σ˜, where Σ˜ is the unique solution in the set of positive matri-
ces of
Σ˜ = A˜Σ˜A˜′ − 1
C˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + V˜
[
A˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + U˜
] [
A˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + U˜
]′
+ W˜ . (14)
Proposition 2 implies that there is convergence to a steady state where the conditional
variance Σ˜t is equal to the constant Σ˜, the regression coefficient G˜t is equal to the constant
G˜ ≡ 1
C˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + V˜
[
A˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + U˜
]
, (15)
and the conditional expectation of the state vector xt evolves according to a linear equation
with constant coefficients. This steady state plays an important role in our analysis: it is also
the limit in the case of parameter uncertainty because Freddy eventually becomes certain
about the parameter values.
3.2 Parameter Uncertainty
We next allow Freddy to be uncertain about the parameters of his model. Parameter uncer-
tainty is a natural assumption in many settings. For example, Freddy might be uncertain
about the extent to which fund managers differ in ability (σ2η) or turn over (ρ).
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Because parameter uncertainty eliminates the normality that is necessary for recursive
filtering, Freddy’s inference problem threatens to be less tractable. Recursive filtering can,
however, be used as part of a two-stage procedure. In a first stage, we fix each model
parameter to a given value and compute the likelihood of a history of signals conditional
on these values. Because the conditional probability distribution is normal, the likelihood
can be computed using the recursive-filtering formulas of Section 3.1. In a second stage,
we combine the likelihood with Freddy’s prior beliefs, through Bayes’ law, and determine
Freddy’s posteriors on the parameters. We show, in particular, that Freddy’s posteriors in
the limit when t goes to ∞ can be derived by maximizing a limit likelihood over all possible
parameter values.
We describe Freddy’s prior beliefs over parameter vectors by a probability measure pi0
and denote by P the closed support of pi0.
12 As we show below, pi0 affects Freddy’s limit
posteriors only through P .
The likelihood function Lt(Ht|p˜) associated to a parameter vector p˜ and history Ht =
{st′}t′=1,..,t is the probability density of observing the signals conditional on p˜. From Bayes’
law, this density is
Lt(Ht|p˜) = Lt(s1 · · · st|p˜) =
t∏
t′=1
`t′(st′ |s1 · · · st′−1, p˜) =
t∏
t′=1
`t′(st′|Ht′−1, p˜),
where `t(st|Ht−1, p˜) denotes the density of st conditional on p˜ and Ht−1. The latter density
can be computed using the recursive-filtering formulas of Section 3.1. Indeed, Proposition 1
shows that conditional on p˜ and Ht−1, xt−1 is normal. Since st is a linear function of xt−1,
it is also normal with a mean and variance that we denote by st(p˜) and σ
2
s,t(p˜), respectively.
Thus:
`t(st|Ht−1, p˜) = 1√
2piσ2s,t(p˜)
exp
[
− [st − st(p˜)]
2
2σ2s,t(p˜)
]
,
and
Lt(Ht|p˜) = 1√
(2pi)t
∏t
t′=1 σ
2
s,t′(p˜)
exp
[
−
t∑
t′=1
[st′ − st′(p˜)]2
2σ2s,t′(p˜)
]
. (16)
Freddy’s posterior beliefs over parameter vectors can be derived from his prior beliefs and
the likelihood through Bayes’ law. To determine posteriors in the limit when t goes to∞, we
12The closed support of pi0 is the intersection of all closed sets C such that pi0(C) = 1. Any neighborhood
B of an element of the closed support satisfies pi0(B) > 0. (Billingsley, 12.9, p.181)
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need to determine the asymptotic behavior of the likelihood function Lt(Ht|p˜). Intuitively,
this behavior depends on how well Freddy can fit the data (i.e., the history of signals) using
the model corresponding to p˜. To evaluate the fit of a model, we consider the true model
according to which the data are generated. The true model is characterized by α = 0 and
the true parameters p ≡ (σ2η, ρ, σ2ω, µ). We denote by st and σ2s,t, respectively, the true mean
and variance of st conditional on Ht−1, and by E the true expectation operator.
Theorem 1
lim
t→∞
logLt(Ht|p˜)
t
= −1
2
[
log
[
2piσ2s(p˜)
]
+
σ2s + e(p˜)
σ2s(p˜)
]
≡ F (p˜) (17)
almost surely, where
σ2s(p˜) ≡ lim
t→∞
σ2s,t(p˜),
σ2s ≡ lim
t→∞
σ2s,t,
e(p˜) ≡ lim
t→∞
E [st(p˜)− st]2 .
Theorem 1 implies that the likelihood function is asymptotically equal to
Lt(Ht|p˜) ∼ exp [tF (p˜)] ,
thus growing exponentially at the rate F (p˜). Note that F (p˜) does not depend on the specific
history Ht of signals, and is thus deterministic. That the likelihood function becomes deter-
ministic for large t follows from the law of large numbers, which is the main result that we
need to prove the theorem. The appropriate large-numbers law in our setting is one applying
to non-independent and non-identically distributed random variables. Non-independence is
because the expected values st(p˜) and st involve the entire history of past signals, and non-
identical distributions are because at any finite time we are not at the steady state.
The growth rate F (p˜) can be interpreted as the fit of the model corresponding to p˜. A
natural conjecture is that when t goes to ∞, Freddy gives weight only to values of p˜ that
maximize F (p˜) over P . Lemma 1 confirms this conjecture under Assumption 1.
Assumption 1 The set P takes the product form Pσ,ρ × Pµ, where Pσ,ρ ⊂ R3 is a set of
values for (σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω) and Pµ ⊂ R a set of values for µ˜.
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Lemma 1 Under Assumption 1, the set m(P ) ≡ argmaxp˜∈PF (p˜) is non-empty. When t goes
to ∞, and for almost all histories, the posterior measure pit converges weakly to a measure
giving weight only to m(P ).
Lemma 2 characterizes the solution to the fit-maximization problem under Assumptions
1 and 2.
Assumption 2 The set Pσ,ρ satisfies the cone property
(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω) ∈ Pσ,ρ ⇒ (λσ˜2η, ρ˜, λσ˜2ω) ∈ Pσ,ρ, ∀λ > 0.
Lemma 2 Under Assumptions 1 and 2, p˜ ∈ m(P ) if and only if
• e(p˜) = minp˜′∈P e(p˜′) ≡ e(P )
• σ2s(p˜) = σ2s + e(p˜).
The characterization of Lemma 2 is intuitive. The function e(p˜) is the expected squared
difference between the conditional mean of st that Freddy computes under p˜, and the true
conditional mean. Thus, e(p˜) measures the error in Freddy’s predictions relative to the true
model, and a model maximizing the fit must minimize this error.
A model maximizing the fit must also generate the right measure of uncertainty about
the future signals. Freddy’s uncertainty under the model corresponding to p˜ is measured
by σ2s(p˜), the conditional variance of st. This must equal to the true error in Freddy’s
predictions, which is the sum of two orthogonal components: the error e(p˜) relative to the
true model, and the error in the true model’s predictions, i.e., the true conditional variance
σ2s .
The cone property ensures that in maximizing the fit, there is no conflict between mini-
mizing e(p˜) and setting σ2s(p˜) = σ
2
s + e(p˜). Indeed, e(p˜) depends on σ˜
2
η and σ˜
2
ω only through
their ratio because only the ratio affects the vector G of regression coefficients. The cone
property ensures that given any feasible ratio, we can scale σ˜2η and σ˜
2
ω to make σ
2
s(p˜) equal to
σ2s+e(p˜). The cone property is satisfied, in particular, when the set P includes all parameter
values:13
P = P0 ≡
{
(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜) : σ˜
2
η ∈ R+, ρ˜ ∈ [0, 1], σ˜2ω ∈ R+, µ˜ ∈ R
}
.
13Although Freddy considers only ρ˜ ∈ [0, 1), P0 includes ρ˜ = 1 because it is a closed set.
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Lemma 3 computes the error e(p˜). In both the lemma and subsequent analysis, we denote
matrices corresponding to the true model by omitting the tilde. For example, the true-model
counterpart of C˜ ≡ [ρ˜,−αρ˜] is C ≡ [ρ, 0].
Lemma 3 The error e(p˜) is given by
e(p˜) = σ2s
∞∑
k=1
(N˜k −Nk)2 + (Nµ)2(µ˜− µ)2, (18)
where
N˜k ≡ C˜(A˜− G˜C˜)k−1G˜+
k−1∑
k′=1
C˜(A˜− G˜C˜)k−1−k′G˜CAk′−1G, (19)
Nk ≡ CAk−1G, (20)
Nµ ≡ 1− C˜
∞∑
k=1
(A˜− G˜C˜)k−1G˜. (21)
The terms N˜k and Nk can be given an intuitive interpretation. Suppose that we are in
steady state (i.e., a large number of periods have elapsed) and set ζt ≡ st − st. The shock
ζt represents the “surprise” in Period t, i.e., the difference between the signal st and its
conditional mean st under the true model. The mean st is a linear function of the history
{ζt′}t′≤t−1 of past shocks, and Nk is the impact of ζt−k, i.e.,
Nk =
∂st
∂ζt−k
=
∂Et−1(st)
∂ζt−k
. (22)
The term N˜k is the counterpart of Nk under Freddy’s model, i.e.,
N˜k =
∂st(p˜)
∂ζt−k
=
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂ζt−k
. (23)
If N˜k 6= Nk, then the shock ζt−k affects Freddy’s mean differently than the true mean. This
translates into a contribution (N˜k − Nk)2 to the error e(p˜). Since the sequence {ζt}t∈Z is
i.i.d., the contributions add up to the sum in (18).
The reason why (22) coincides with (20) is as follows. Because of linearity, the derivative
in (22) can be computed by setting all shocks {ζt′}t′≤t−1 to zero, except for ζt−k = 1. The
shock ζt−k = 1 raises the mean of the state θt−k conditional on Period t−k by the regression
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coefficient G1. This effect decays over time according to the persistence parameter ρ because
all subsequent shocks {ζt′}t′=t−k+1,..,t−1 are zero, i.e., no surprises occur. Therefore, the
mean of θt−1 conditional on Period t− 1 is raised by ρk−1G1, and the mean of st is raised by
ρkG1 = CA
k−1G = Nk.
The reason why (19) is more complicated than (20) is that after the shock ζt−k = 1, Freddy
does not expect the shocks {ζt′}t′=t−k+1,..,t−1 to be zero. This is both because the gambler’s
fallacy leads him to expect negative shocks, and because he can converge to G˜1 6= G1, thus
estimating incorrectly the increase in the state. Because, however, he observes the shocks
{ζt′}t′=t−k+1,..,t−1 to be zero, he treats them as surprises and updates accordingly. This
generates the extra terms in (19). When α is small, i.e., Freddy is close to rational, the
updating generated by {ζt′}t′=t−k+1,..,t−1 is of second order relative to that generated by ζt−k.
The term N˜k then takes a form analogous to Nk:
N˜k ≈ C˜A˜kG˜ = ρ˜kG˜1 − αρ˜(δρ˜ − αρ˜)k−1G˜2. (24)
Intuitively, the shock ζt−k = 1 raises Freddy’s mean of the state θt−k conditional on Period
t− k by G˜1, and the effect decays over time at the rate ρ˜k. Freddy also attributes the shock
ζt−k = 1 partly to luck through G˜2. He then expects future signals to be lower because of
the gambler’s fallacy, and the effect decays at the rate (δρ˜ − αρ˜)k ≈ δkρ˜ .
We conclude this section by determining Tommy’s limit posteriors. We examine, in
particular, whether Tommy converges to the true parameter values when he initially enter-
tains all values, i.e., P = P0. Since Tommy is a Bayesian, his limit posteriors solve the
fit-maximization problem for α = 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose that α = 0.
• If σ2η > 0 and ρ > 0, then m(P0) = {(σ2η, ρ, σ2ω, µ)}.
• If σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0, then
m(P0) =

(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜) : [σ˜
2
η = 0, ρ˜ ∈ [0, 1), σ˜2ω = σ2η + σ2ω, µ˜ = µ]
or [σ˜2η = 0, ρ˜ = 1, σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω]
or [σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω, ρ˜ = 0, µ˜ = µ]
 .
Proposition 3 shows that Tommy converges to the true parameter values if σ2η > 0 and
ρ > 0. If σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0, however, then he remains undecided between the true model and
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a set of other models. The intuition is that in both cases signals are i.i.d. in steady state:
either because the state converges to a constant value (σ2η = 0) or because it is not persistent
(ρ = 0). Therefore, Tommy cannot identify which of σ2η or ρ is zero. Of course, Tommy’s
failure to converge to the true model is inconsequential because all models he converges to
predict correctly that signals are i.i.d.
4 Independent Signals
In this section we consider Freddy’s inference problem when signals are i.i.d. As pointed out
in the previous section, i.i.d. signals can be generated when σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0. We first study
Freddy’s “free-form” inference when he initially entertains all parameter values (P = P0).
We next endow Freddy with prior knowledge on the true values of some parameters.
4.1 No Prior Knowledge
Proposition 4 characterizes Freddy’s convergent beliefs.
Proposition 4 Suppose that α > 0, and σ2η = 0 or ρ = 0. Then e(P0) = 0 and
m(P0) = {(σ˜2η, 0, σ˜2ω, µ) : σ˜2η + σ˜2ω = σ2η + σ2ω}.
Since e(P0) = 0, Freddy ends up predicting the signals correctly as i.i.d., despite the
gambler’s fallacy. Intuitively, the fallacy leads him to exaggerate the extent to which a small
sample resembles the underlying population – provided that the entire sample is generated
by the same distribution. Freddy ends up believing, however, that a different distribution
generates the signal in each period. Indeed, the distribution is linked to the state, and Freddy
converges to the belief that ρ˜ = 0, i.e., the state in one period has no relation to the state in
the next. In the mutual-fund context, Freddy assumes that managers stay in the fund for
only one period. Therefore, his fallacious belief that a given manager’s performance should
average out over multiple periods has no effect. Formally, when ρ˜ = 0, the strength αρ˜ of
the gambler’s fallacy in (3) is αρ˜ = αρ˜ = 0.
The result of Proposition 4 relies on our interpretation of the gambler’s fallacy as applying
to the distribution generating the signals for a given state, but not to the distribution
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generating those distributions, i.e., generating the state. For example, Freddy expects that
a mutual-fund manager who over-performs in one period is more likely to under-perform
in the next. He does not expect, however, that if high-ability managers join the fund in
one period, low-ability managers are more likely to follow. The latter belief could lead to
incorrect predictions even under a model in which ρ˜ = 0, i.e., managers stay in the fund for
only one period.
We believe that the gambler’s fallacy for the state as not as psychologically compelling as
for the signals. One reason is that it has a “second-order” flavor, applying to distributions
of distributions rather than distributions of signals. Moreover, while the state follows a
stochastic process in our model, it could instead be evolving deterministically. Putting
these issues aside, the result of Proposition 4 that we wish to emphasize is not Freddy’s
correct predictions, since predictions are incorrect in the more general settings of Sections
4.2 and 5. A more robust result is that Freddy attempts to explain the absence of systematic
reversals by believing that the environment (distribution generating the signals) changes
overly frequently. In Proposition 4 this result takes the extreme form that Freddy converges
to ρ˜ = 0, but in Sections 4.2 and 5 convergence is to ρ˜ between zero and the true value ρ.
4.2 Prior Knowledge
In this section, we allow Freddy to rule out some parameter values based on prior knowledge.
Ironically, prior knowledge can hurt Freddy. Indeed, suppose that he knows with confidence
that ρ˜ is bounded away from zero. Then, he cannot converge to the belief that ρ˜ = 0, and
consequently cannot predict the signals correctly. Thus, prior knowledge can be harmful
because it reduces Freddy’s flexibility to come up with the incorrect model that eliminates
the gambler’s fallacy.
A straightforward example of prior knowledge is when Freddy knows with confidence
that the state is constant over time: this translates to the dogmatic belief that ρ˜ = 1 and
σ˜2η = 0. A prototypical occurrence of such a belief is when people observe the flips of a coin
they know is fair. The state can be defined as the probability distribution of heads and tails,
and is known and constant.
If in our model Freddy has a dogmatic belief that ρ˜ = 1 and σ˜2η = 0, then he predicts
reversals according the gambler’s fallacy. This is consistent with the experimental evidence
presented in Section 2. Of course, our model matches the evidence by construction, but we
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believe that this is a strength of our approach (in taking the gambler’s fallacy as a primitive
bias and examining whether the hot-hand fallacy can follow as an implication). Indeed,
one could argue that the hot-hand fallacy is a primitive bias, either unconnected to the
gambler’s fallacy or perhaps even generating it. But then one would have to explain why
such a primitive bias does not arise in experiments involving fair coins.
The hot-hand fallacy tends to arise in settings where people are uncertain about the
mechanism generating the data, and where a belief that an underlying state varies over time
is plausible a priori. Such settings are common when human skill is involved. For example,
it is plausible - and often true - that the performance of a basketball player can fluctuate
systematically over time because of mood, well-being, etc. Consistent with the evidence, we
show below that our approach can generate the hot-hand fallacy in such settings, provided
that people are also confident that the state exhibits some persistence.
More specifically, we assume that Freddy allows for the possibility that the state varies
over time, but is confident that ρ˜ is bounded away from zero. For example, he can be
uncertain as to whether fund managers differ in ability (σ˜2η > 0), but know with certainty
that they stay in a fund for more than a period (e.g., a month). We take the closed support
of Freddy’s priors to be
P = Pρ ≡
{
(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜) : σ˜
2
η ∈ R+, ρ˜ ∈ [ρ, 1], σ˜2ω ∈ R+, µ˜ ∈ R
}
,
where ρ is a lower bound strictly greater than zero and smaller than the true value ρ. Note
that since ρ > 0 and signals are assumed i.i.d., the true value σ2η has to be zero.
To determine Freddy’s convergent beliefs, we must minimize the error e(p˜) over the set
Pρ. The problem is more complicated than in Propositions 3 and 4: it cannot be solved by
finding parameter vectors p˜ such that e(p˜) = 0 because no such vectors exist in Pρ. Instead,
we need to evaluate e(p˜) for all p˜ and minimize over Pρ. Eq. (18) shows that e(p˜) depends on
the vector G˜ of regression coefficients, which in turn depends on p˜ in a complicated fashion
through the recursive-filtering formulas of Section 3.1. This makes it difficult to solve the
problem in closed form. But a closed-form solution can be derived for small α, i.e., Freddy
close to rational. We next present this solution because it provides useful intuition and has
similar properties to the numerical solution for general α.
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Proposition 5 Suppose that σ2η = 0 and ρ ≥ ρ > 0. When α converges to zero, the set{(
σ˜2η
ασ˜2ω
, ρ˜, σ˜2ω, µ˜
)
:
(
σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜
) ∈ m(Pρ)}
converges (in the set topology) to the point (z, ρ, σ2ω, µ), where
z ≡ (1− ρ
2)2
1− ρ2δ . (25)
Proposition 5 implies that Freddy’s convergent beliefs for small α are p˜ ≈ (αzσ2ω, ρ, σ2ω, µ).
Convergence to ρ˜ = ρ is intuitive. Indeed, Proposition 4 shows that Freddy attempts to
explain the absence of systematic reversals by underestimating the state’s persistence ρ˜.
The smallest value of ρ˜ consistent with the prior knowledge that ρ˜ ∈ [ρ, 1] is ρ.
Freddy’s belief that ρ˜ = ρ leaves him unable to explain fully the absence of reversals. To
generate a fuller explanation, he develops the additional fallacious belief that σ˜2η ≈ αzσ2ω > 0,
i.e., the state varies over time. Thus, in a mutual-fund context, he overestimates both the
extent of managerial turnover and that of differences in ability. Overestimating turnover
helps him explain the absence of reversals in fund returns because he believes that reversals
concern only the performance of individual managers. Overestimating differences in ability
helps him further because he can attribute streaks of high or low fund returns to individual
managers being above or below average. As we show below, the belief in the changing state
can generate a hot-hand fallacy: Freddy can predict that streaks of high or low returns will
continue despite all managers being average.
The error-minimization problem has a useful graphical representation. Consider Freddy’s
expectation of st conditional on Period t−1, as a function of the past signals. Eq. (23) shows
that the effect of the signal in Period t− k, holding other signals to their mean, is N˜k. Eq.
(24) expresses N˜k as the sum of two terms. Subsequent to a high st−k, Freddy believes that
the state has increased, which raises his expectation of st (term ρ˜
kG˜1). But he also believes
that luck should reverse, which lowers his expectation (term −αρ˜(δρ˜ − αρ˜)k−1G˜2). Figure 1
plots these terms (dotted and dashed line, respectively) and their sum N˜k (solid line), as
a function of the lag k. Since signals are i.i.d. under the true model, Nk = 0. Therefore,
minimizing the infinite sum in (18) amounts to finding (
σ˜2η
σ˜2ω
, ρ˜) that minimize the average
squared distance between the solid line and the x-axis.
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Figure 1: Effect of a signal in Period t− k on Freddy’s expectation E˜t−1(st),
as a function of k. The dotted line represents the belief that the state has
changed, the dashed line represents the effect of the gambler’s fallacy, and the
solid line is N˜k, the sum of the two effects.
Figure 1 shows that N˜k is not always of the same sign. Thus, a high past signal does not
lead Freddy to predict always a high or always a low signal. Suppose instead that he always
predicts a low signal because the gambler’s fallacy dominates the belief that the state has
increased (i.e., the dotted line is uniformly closer to the x-axis than the dashed line). This
means that he converges to a small value of σ˜2η, believing that the state’s variation is small,
and treating signals as not very informative. But then, a larger value of σ˜2η would shift the
dotted line up, reducing the average distance between the solid line and the x-axis.
The change in N˜k’s sign is from negative to positive. Thus, a high signal in the recent past
leads Freddy to predict a low signal, while a high signal in the more distant past leads him to
predict a high signal. This is because the belief that the state has increased decays at the rate
ρ˜k, while the effect of the gambler’s fallacy decays at the faster rate (δρ˜−αρ˜)k = ρ˜k(δ−α)k.
In other words, after a high signal Freddy expects luck to reverse quickly but views the
increase in the state as more long-lived. The reason why he expects luck to reverse quickly
relative to the state is that he views luck as specific to a given state (e.g., a given fund
manager).
We next draw the implications of our results for Freddy’s predictions after streaks. We
consider a streak of identical signals between Periods t− k and t− 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose that α is small, σ2η = 0, ρ ≥ ρ > 0, and Freddy considers parameter
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values in the set Pρ. Then, in steady state
k∑
k′=1
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂st−k′
is negative for k = 1 and becomes positive as k increases.
Proposition 6 shows that Freddy predicts a low signal following a short streak of high
signals, but a high signal following a longer streak. Thus, the gambler’s fallacy dominates
after short streaks but the hot-hand fallacy appears after longer streaks. This is consistent
with Figure 1 because the effect of a streak is the sum of the effects N˜k of each signal in
the streak. Since N˜k is negative for small k, Freddy predicts a low signal following a short
streak. But as streak length increases, the positive values of N˜k overtake the negative values,
generating a positive cumulative effect.
Propositions 5 and 6 make use of the closed-form solutions derived for small α. For
general α, the fit-maximization problem can be solved numerically and the results confirm
the closed-form solutions: Freddy converges to σ˜2η > 0, ρ˜ = ρ, and µ˜ = µ, and his predictions
after streaks are as in Proposition 6.14
5 Serially Correlated Signals
In this section we consider Freddy’s inference problem when the signals are serially correlated.
Serial correlation arises when the state varies over time (σ2η > 0) and is persistent (ρ > 0).
To highlight the new effects relative to the i.i.d. case, we assume that Freddy has no prior
knowledge on parameter values.
Recall that with i.i.d. signals and no prior knowledge, Freddy predicts correctly because
he converges to the belief that ρ˜ = 0, i.e., the state in one period has no relation to the
state in the next. When signals are serially correlated, the belief ρ˜ = 0 obviously generates
incorrect predictions. But predictions are also incorrect under a belief ρ˜ > 0 because the
gambler’s fallacy then takes effect. Therefore, there is no parameter vector p˜ ∈ P0 achieving
zero error e(p˜).15
14The result that σ˜2η > 0 can be shown analytically. The proof is available upon request.
15The proof of this result is available upon request.
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To minimize the error, we proceed as in Section 4.2, evaluating e(p˜) for all p˜ and min-
imizing over P0. We solve this problem in closed form for small α and compare with the
numerical solution for general α. In addition to α, we take the variance σ2η of the shocks
to the state to be small, meaning that signals are close to i.i.d. We set ν ≡ σ2η/(ασ2ω) and
assume that α and σ2η converge to zero holding ν constant. The case where σ
2
η remains
constant while α converges to zero can be derived as a limit for ν =∞.
Proposition 7 Suppose that ρ > 0. When α and σ2η converge to zero, holding ν constant,
the set {(
σ˜2η
ασ˜2ω
, ρ˜, σ˜2ω, µ˜
)
:
(
σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω, µ˜
) ∈ m(P0)}
converges (in the set topology) to the point (z, r, σ2² , µ), where
z ≡ νρ(1− r
2)2
r(1− ρ2)(1− ρr) +
(1− r2)2
1− r2δ (26)
and r solves
νρ(ρ− r)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr)2H1(r) =
r2(1− δ)
(1− r2δ)2H2(r), (27)
for
H1(r) ≡ νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr) +
r(1− δ) [2− ρr(1 + δ)− r2δ + ρ2r4δ2]
(1− r2δ)2(1− ρrδ)2 ,
H2(r) ≡ νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr) +
r(1− δ) (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)
(1− r2δ)(1− r2δ2)2 .
Because H1(r) and H2(r) are positive, (27) implies that r ∈ (0, ρ). Thus, Freddy con-
verges to a persistence parameter ρ˜ = r that is between zero and the true value ρ. As in
Section 4, Freddy underestimates ρ˜ in his attempt to explain the absence of systematic re-
versals. But he does not converge all the way to ρ˜ = 0 because he must explain the signals’
serial correlation. Consistent with intuition, ρ˜ is close to zero when the gambler’s fallacy is
strong relative to the serial correlation (ν small), and is close to ρ in the opposite case.
Consider next Freddy’s estimate σ˜2η of the variance of the shocks to the state. Section 4.2
shows that when the true variance σ2η is zero, Freddy can develop the fallacious belief that
σ˜2η > 0 as a way to counteract the effect of the gambler’s fallacy. When σ
2
η is positive, we find
the analogous result that Freddy overestimates σ˜2η. Indeed, he converges to σ˜
2
η ≈ αzσ2ω =
(z/ν)σ2η, which is larger than σ
2
η because of (26) and r < ρ. Note that z in (26) is decreasing
25
in r. Thus, Freddy overestimates σ˜2η partly as a way to compensate for underestimating ρ˜.
The error minimization problem can be represented graphically. Consider Freddy’s ex-
pectation of st conditional on Period t−1, as a function of the past signals. The effect of the
signal in Period t − k, holding other signals to their mean, is N˜k. Figure 2 plots N˜k (solid
line) as a function of k. It also decomposes N˜k to the belief that the state has increased
(dotted line) and the effect of the gambler’s fallacy (dashed line). The new element relative
to Figure 1 is that an increase in st−k also affects the expectation Et−1(st) under the true
model. This effect, Nk, is represented by the solid line with diamonds. Minimizing the
infinite sum in (18) amounts to finding (
σ˜2η
σ˜2ω
, ρ˜) that minimize the average squared distance
between the solid line and the solid line with diamonds.
0 5 10 15 20
Ñk  - Freddy
Changing state
Gambler's fallacy
Nk  - Tommy
k
Figure 2: Effect of a signal in Period t− k on Freddy’s expectation E˜t−1(st),
as a function of k. The dotted line represents the belief that the state has
changed, the dashed line represents the effect of the gambler’s fallacy, and the
solid line is N˜k, the sum of the two effects. The solid line with diamonds is
Nk, the effect on the expectation Et−1(st) under the true model.
For large k, N˜k is below Nk, meaning that Freddy under-reacts to signals in the distant
past. This is because he underestimates the state’s persistence parameter ρ˜, thus believing
that the information learned from signals about the state becomes obsolete overly fast. Note
that under-reaction to distant signals is a novel feature of the serial-correlation case. Indeed,
with i.i.d. signals, Freddy’s underestimation of ρ˜ does not lead to under-reaction because
there is no reaction under the true model.
Freddy’s reaction to signals in the more recent past is in line with the i.i.d. case. Since
N˜k cannot be below Nk uniformly (otherwise e(p˜) could be made smaller for a larger value
of σ˜2η), it has to exceed Nk for smaller values of k. Thus, Freddy over-reacts to signals in the
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more recent past. The intuition is as in Section 4.2: in overestimating σ˜2η, Freddy exaggerates
the signals’ informativeness about the state. Finally, Freddy under-reacts to signals in the
very recent past because of the gambler’s fallacy. Proposition 8 examines the implications
of these results for predictions after streaks.
Proposition 8 Suppose that α and σ2η are small, ρ > 0, and Freddy has no prior knowledge
(P = P0). Then, in steady state
k∑
k′=1
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂st−k′
−
k∑
k′=1
∂Et−1(st)
∂st−k′
is negative for k = 1, becomes positive as k increases, and then becomes negative again.
Proposition 8 shows that Freddy under-reacts to short streaks, over-reacts to longer
streaks, and under-reacts again to very long streaks. The under-reaction to short streaks
is because of the gambler’s fallacy. Longer streaks generate over-reaction because Freddy
overestimates the signals’ informativeness about the state. But he also underestimates the
state’s persistence, thus under-reacting to very long streaks.
The numerical results for general α confirm most of the closed-form results. The only ex-
ception is that N˜k−Nk can change sign only once, from positive to negative. Under-reaction
then occurs only to very long streaks. This tends to happen when Freddy underestimates the
state’s persistence significantly (because α is large relative to σ˜2η). As a way to compensate
for his error, he overestimates σ˜2η significantly, viewing signals as very informative about the
state. Even very short streaks can then lead him to believe that the change in the state is
large and dominates the effect of the gambler’s fallacy.
6 Finance Applications
Sections 4 and 5 show that the gambler’s fallacy can influence Freddy’s perception of several
aspects of his environment. In particular, he can underestimate the state’s persistence and
overestimate the signals’ informativeness about the state. While these errors help to counter-
act the fallacious belief in reversals, they generally do not offset it fully, leading to incorrect
predictions. We next explore the implications of these results for economic decisions. Our
27
goal is to show that the gambler’s fallacy can have a wide range of implications, and that
our normal-linear model is a useful tool for pursuing them.
One way to map Freddy’s predictions into economic decisions is to interpret signals as
financial returns and Freddy as an investor. Suppose that in Period t− 1 Freddy can invest
in a risky asset with return st and a riskless asset with return r. For simplicity, we assume
that Freddy has an one-period horizon, maximizing expected utility over Period t wealth.16
To keep with the normal-linear structure, we take utility over wealth to be exponential
with coefficient of absolute risk aversion a. Finally, we assume that we are in steady state.
Denoting wealth in Period t′ ∈ {t − 1, t} by W˜t′ , and the investment in the risky asset by
X˜t−1, the maximization problem is
max
X˜t−1
E˜t−1
[
− exp(−aW˜t)
]
(28)
subject to the budget constraint
W˜t = (W˜t−1 − X˜t−1)(1 + r) + X˜t−1(1 + st).
Because of normality and exponential utility, the problem is mean-variance and the optimal
investment is
X˜t−1 =
E˜t−1(st)− r
aV˜ art−1(st)
, (29)
where V˜ ar denotes the variance assessed by Freddy. Note that in steady state the variance
V˜ art−1(st) is constant (equal to σ2s(p˜)). We denote this constant by V˜ ar1, setting more
generally V˜ ark ≡ V˜ art−k(st). Using (29), we can compute several quantities of interest.
6.1 Trading Volume
The change in Freddy’s investment between Periods t− 1 and t is
∆X˜t ≡ X˜t − X˜t−1 = E˜t(st+1)− E˜t−1(st)
aV˜ ar1
. (30)
16A literal interpretation of this assumption is that there are overlapping generations of investors, each
of whom lives for one period but observes the entire history of past signals. Alternatively, we can view the
assumption as a simplification of the infinite-horizon problem that considers only the myopic demand and
ignores the demand for intertemporal hedging (Merton (1971)).
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Thus, Freddy changes his investment if he believes that expected return has changed. The
quantity ∆X˜t is a measure of Freddy’s trading activity in Period t, and we define trading
volume Q˜t as the absolute value |∆X˜t|.17 We also define average volume Q˜ as the uncondi-
tional expectation of Q˜t, i.e., Q˜ ≡ E(Q˜t). Proposition 9 computes Freddy’s average volume
and compares it to that of a Bayesian investor (Tommy) with the same preferences. The
comparison is made for two settings in which Freddy converges to incorrect predictions: i.i.d.
returns and prior knowledge that ρ˜ is bounded away from zero (Section 4.2), and serially
correlated returns and no prior knowledge (Section 5).
Proposition 9 Freddy’s average volume is
Q˜ =
√
2
pi
σs
aV˜ ar1
√√√√ ∞∑
k=1
(N˜k − N˜k−1)2, (31)
where N˜0 ≡ 0. Tommy’s average volume Q is given by (31) without the tildes and where
N0 ≡ 0.
• Suppose that σ2η = 0 and Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ ≥ ρ for ρ ∈ (0, ρ]. Then
Q˜ > Q = 0.
• Suppose that α and σ2η are small, ρ > 0, and Freddy has no prior knowledge (P = P0).
Then Q˜ > Q if ν ≡ σ2η/ασ2ω is small, and Q˜ < Q if ν is large.
The result in the i.i.d. case is straightforward. Since expected returns are constant,
Tommy’s volume is zero. But if Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ is bounded away from
zero, then he ends up believing that expected returns are time-varying. Thus, his volume
is positive and exceeds Tommy’s. Note that this holds independently of Freddy’s prior
knowledge on σ˜2η, i.e., whether or not he ends up believing in the hot hand.
The result in the serial-correlation case is more subtle than in the i.i.d. case both because
Tommy’s volume is non-zero and because Freddy is assumed to have no prior knowledge.
To explain the intuition, we return to Figure 2 of Section 5, and plot it for two different
17Our definition of trading volume assumes that the return st is due only to dividends. Suppose that
st = sdt +sct , where sdt is due to dividends and sct to capital gains. Then, if Freddy buys shares worth X˜t−1 in
Period t−1, he receives a dividend X˜t−1sdt in Period t, and his shares are worth X˜t−1sct . Thus, his net trade
in Period t is X˜t − X˜t−1(1 + sct) and coincides with X˜t − X˜t−1 only when sct = 0. When sct 6= 0, X˜t − X˜t−1
represents the component of the net trade that is due to changes in expectations about future returns.
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values of ν as Figure 3 below. In each plot, the solid line represents the effect N˜k of the
return k− 1 periods ago on Freddy’s forecast of next period’s return, and the solid line with
diamonds represents the effect Nk for Tommy. Note that N˜k is also the effect on Freddy’s
investment, because the investment is linear in the forecast. Moreover, N˜k − N˜k−1 is the
effect on Freddy’s net trade, provided that we set N˜0 ≡ 0 to cover the case k = 1.
0 5 10 15 20
Ñk  - Freddy
Nk  - Tommy
k
0 5 10 15 20
Ñk  - Freddy
Nk  - Tommy
k
Figure 3: The solid line represents the effect N˜k of the return k − 1 periods
ago on Freddy’s forecast of next period’s return. The solid line with diamonds
represents the effect Nk for Tommy. The plot to the left is for small ν ≡
σ2η/ασ
2
ω, and the plot to the right is for large ν.
Consider now Freddy’s net trade in Period t as a function of the history of past returns.
This function is linear, and the coefficient of the return innovation ζt−k+1 is N˜k−N˜k−1. Since
innovations are i.i.d., the variance of net trade can be derived by squaring the coefficients and
adding them up. The volume is equal to the square root of the variance (times a constant)
because of normality. Thus, comparing Freddy’s volume to Tommy’s amounts to comparing
the average squared slope of the lines in Figure 3, where the average is taken over k, the
slope for k is defined as the value for k minus the value for k − 1, and the value for k = 0 is
taken to be zero.
The plot to the left in Figure 3 is for small ν, i.e., strong gambler’s fallacy relative to serial
correlation. In that case, Freddy converges to a small value of the persistence parameter ρ˜
and a large value of σ˜2η/σ
2
η, i.e., treats signals as very informative about the state but also
believes that the information becomes fast obsolete (Proposition 7). Following a high signal,
Freddy establishes a smaller initial position that Tommy because he expects a short-term
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reversal of luck. Once the expectation of the reversal subsides, he builds the position to a
level larger than Tommy because he treats the signal as very positive news. But he also
believes that news are short-lived, and unwinds the position rapidly. Because of the large
position and the rapid unwinding, Freddy’s trades are large, and the sum of squared slopes
is larger than for Tommy. On the other hand, when ν is large, as in the plot to the right,
Freddy builds and unwinds the position slowly. The sum of squared slopes is then smaller
than for Tommy because of Tommy’s larger initial trade.
Turning to applications, suppose that st is the return on a mutual fund, in which case
our volume variable can be interpreted as the flow in or out of the fund. A puzzling fact
about fund flows is that they are strongly related to funds’ lagged returns (e.g., Chevalier
and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998)) even though the latter do not appear to be
strong predictors of future returns (e.g., Carhart (1997)).18 Berk and Green (2004) propose
a rational explanation for this puzzle. They assume that ability differs across managers
and can be inferred from returns. Able managers perform well and receive inflows, but
because of decreasing returns to managing a large fund, their performance drops to that of
average managers. This explanation, however, requires large ability differentials to match the
empirical flow-performance relationship: the standard deviation of the ability distribution
must correspond to an annual return of 6%, meaning that in the absence of decreasing
returns, top-quartile managers would outperform bottom-quartile ones by more than 15%.
Our results suggest that return predictability or differences in managerial ability do not
have to be overly large to match the extent of performance-driven fund flows. Indeed,
Proposition 9 shows that Freddy generates non-zero flows even in the absence of ability
differences, as long as he is confident that ability in consecutive periods is related (ρ˜ bounded
away from zero).19 Even when Freddy does not hold such a confident belief, his flows exceed
Tommy’s if differences in ability exist and are not too large. We return to this issue in the
calibrated example of Section 6.4, where we show that Freddy’s flows exceed Tommy’s for
18See also Baquero and Verbeek (2006) who regress hedge-fund flows on lagged returns and a proxy for
the lagged returns’ true predictive power about future returns. They find that lagged returns have an effect
above and beyond their ability to predict future returns.
19The i.i.d. case generates the counterfactual implication that good performance leads to short-run out-
flows, because Freddy expects luck to reverse. One way to address this issue is to focus on the case of serial
correlation (and no prior knowledge), where the flow-performance relationship is generally positive even in
the short run. But the issue could also be addressed within the i.i.d. framework if, for some reason, Freddy’s
estimate of σ˜2η, i.e., of differences in ability, is larger than the one derived in Section 4.1. In Section 6.2 we
propose one reason: a fallacious belief in financial expertise that Freddy can develop if he overestimates the
value of fund managers’ information.
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plausible parameter values.
6.2 Value of Information
Our analysis so far assumes that signals are freely available. We next examine how much
Freddy would be willing to pay for them, and how this compares to Tommy’s valuation.
We denote by U˜1(W˜t−1, E˜t−1(st)) the maximum in (28), i.e., Freddy’s maximum utility when
he observes all returns up to Period t − 1. We also denote by U˜k(W˜t−1, E˜t−k(st)) Freddy’s
maximum utility when he chooses investment in Period t−1 but observes returns up to Period
t−k only (in which case his expectation of st is E˜t−k(st)). If Freddy pays I˜k to observe the k
most recent returns {st′}t′=t−k,..,t−1, then he will receive the utility U˜1(W˜t−1− I˜t−1, E˜t−1(st)).
The value I˜k of the information in the k most recent returns is defined by
U˜k+1(W˜t−1, E˜t−k−1(st)) = E˜t−k−1U˜1(W˜t−1 − I˜k, E˜t−1(st)). (32)
Because of normality and exponential utility, I˜k takes a very simple form. In particular, it
does not depend on the realization of E˜t−k−1(st), nor on Freddy’s wealth.
Proposition 10 Freddy’s value of observing the k most recent returns is
I˜k =
1
2a(1 + r)
log
(
V˜ ark+1
V˜ ar1
)
=
1
2a(1 + r)
log
(
1 +
k∑
k′=1
(C˜A˜k
′−1G˜)2
)
. (33)
Tommy’s value Ik is given by (33) without the tildes.
• Suppose that σ2η = 0 and Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ ≥ ρ for ρ ∈ (0, ρ]. Then
Ik = 0 for all k ≥ 1, and I˜k > 0 for all k ≥ 2.
• Suppose that α and σ2η are small, ρ > 0, and Freddy has no prior knowledge (P = P0).
Then there exists k such that I˜k > Ik. Moreover, I˜∞ < I∞ if ν is small, and I˜∞ > I∞
if ν is large.
The result in the i.i.d. case is straightforward. Since past returns do not predict future
ones, Tommy’s value of information is zero. But if Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ is
bounded away from zero, then he ends up believing that returns are non-i.i.d. and treats
past returns as valuable information.
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To explain the intuition in the serial-correlation case, we return to Figure 3 that repre-
sents the effect of past returns on Freddy’s and Tommy’s forecast of next period’s return.
Intuitively, the larger the effect is, the larger the value of observing past returns should be.
Eq. (33) confirms this intuition. For example, Tommy’s value of information is an increasing
function of
∑k
k′=1(CA
k′−1G)2. This term is equal (from (20)) to
∑k
k′=1N
2
k′ , i.e., the sum of
squared effects of the k most recent returns on Tommy’s forecast. Freddy’s value of infor-
mation is the same increasing function of
∑k
k′=1(C˜A˜
k′−1G˜)2, and for small α this term is
approximately equal (from (24)) to
∑k
k′=1 N˜
2
k′ .
20 Thus, for small α, comparing the value of
information for Freddy and Tommy amounts to comparing the average squared height of the
first k points of the lines in Figure 3.
Proposition 10 shows that for some values of k, the average height of the first k points on
Freddy’s line is larger than for Tommy’s line. Thus, Freddy overestimates the informational
value of recent return histories, and this is because he overestimates the information that re-
turns convey about the state.21 But because he believes information to become fast obsolete,
he underestimates the value of returns in the distant past. This can lead him to undervalue
the full return history. Such undervaluation occurs for small ν, i.e., strong gambler’s fallacy
relative to serial correlation, which is when Freddy underestimates significantly the state’s
persistence. Figure 3 provides a graphical interpretation: because Freddy’s line in the plot
to the left converges to zero quickly, its average height is smaller than for Tommy’s line.
Turning to applications, suppose that st is the i.i.d. return on a traded asset (e.g., stock,
bond). Suppose also that Freddy is confident that expected returns in consecutive periods are
related. Then, because he ends up treating returns as non-i.i.d., he can believe in technical
analysis (chartism), whereby past returns are used to predict the future. Moreover, if he
does not observe the detailed return history, he can view agents who do so (e.g., mutual-fund
managers, stockbrokers) as valuable experts. This could be one explanation why individuals
invest in actively-managed funds, even though the funds do not seem to outperform their
market benchmarks.22 Note that if Freddy develops a belief in financial expertise, he can also
believe that ability differences between managers are potentially large. This could reinforce
20The intuition why the equality for Freddy is approximate is that his value of information involves the
effects under his model (C˜A˜k−1G˜) and not under the true model (N˜k). For small α, the effects coincide
approximately.
21Freddy can underestimate the informational value of the most recent return because of his initial under-
reaction. For some parameter values, however, the under-reaction can be so severe as to make the effect of
the most recent return negative and larger in absolute value than for Tommy.
22See Fama (1991) for a survey of the evidence.
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the implications of Section 6.1 on the flow-performance relationship.23
6.3 Equilibrium Prices
We next examine how Freddy’s fallacious beliefs can affect equilibrium prices. Recall from
Lemma 2 that when Freddy predicts the signals erroneously, he overestimates their variance
because he attributes his prediction error to signal noise. His average investment is then
lower than Tommy’s, meaning that the risk premium in a market with Freddies can be higher
than with Tommies.24 This could perhaps speak to the equity-premium puzzle (Mehra and
Prescott (1985)) that stocks’ expected return is high relative to risk.
A second implication provides a link between our work and Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny
(BSV 1998). In BSV, investors do not realize that innovations to a company’s earnings
are i.i.d., but believe them to be drawn either from a regime with excess reversals or from
one with excess streaks. If the reversal regime is the more common, the stock price under-
reacts to short streaks because investors expect a reversal. The price over-reacts, however,
to longer streaks because investors take them as sign of a switch to the streak regime. This
can generate short-run momentum and long-run reversals in stock returns, consistent with
the empirical evidence (surveyed in BSV). Section 4.2 has similar implications because it
shows that in i.i.d. environments Freddy can under-react to short streaks and over-react to
longer ones. But while the implications are similar, our approach is different. In particular,
BSV provide a psychological foundation for their assumptions by appealing to a combination
of biases: the conservatism bias for the reversal regime and the representativeness bias for
the streak regime. Our model, by contrast, not only derives such biases from the single
underlying bias of the gambler’s fallacy, but in doing so provides predictions as to which
biases are the most relevant in different informational settings.
23The implications on financial expertise rely on Freddy’s confident belief that ρ˜ is bounded away from
zero. Without such a belief, Freddy predicts correctly in an i.i.d. environment, and can underestimate the
informational value of the return history under serial correlation. A result that does not rely on beliefs about
ρ˜ is the overestimation of the value of recent returns. Thus, investors could be overpaying for newsletters
that analyze the recent performance of stocks or mutual funds, while underpaying for long-horizon studies.
24Formally, (29) implies that Freddy’s average investment in the risky asset is E(X˜t) = (µ− r)/(aV˜ ar1).
Since Lemma 2 implies that V˜ ar1 = V ar1 + e(p˜), Freddy’s average investment is lower than Tommy’s as
long as e(p˜) > 0 and µ > r. Note a surprising implication of our results in the case of i.i.d. returns and
prior knowledge about ρ˜: Freddy views returns as predictable and yet after conditioning on the predictive
information views returns as more uncertain than they truly are.
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6.4 Calibration
We conclude with a calibration exercise that serves both to compute the effects that our
model generates for plausible parameter values and confirm the robustness of the closed-
form results derived for small α. We take periods to be months, meaning that investors
check the performance of their fund managers once a month. We set ρ = 0.98, meaning
that shocks to managerial ability have a half-life of approximately three years (ρ36 = 0.48).
Such a half-life seems reasonable: for example, Jagannathan, Malakhov and Novikov (JMN
2006) estimate that approximately half of the abnormal performance of a hedge fund over a
three-year period spills over to the next three years. We calibrate σ2η/σ
2
ω through the ratio
of unconditional variances of θt and st, which is
σ2η/(1−ρ2)
σ2η/(1−ρ2)+σ2ω . The variable θt corresponds to
abnormal expected returns (“Jensen alpha”), and its standard deviation in the cross-section
of hedge funds examined in JMN is about 2.4% per year. JMN also report a cross-sectional
standard deviation of fund returns (st) ranging from 10% to 25% per year, depending on the
year. Assuming that cross-sectional variances translate to unconditional ones in our model,
the implied values of σ2η/σ
2
ω range from 0.0004 to 0.0025. We also consider larger values,
in line with Berk and Green’s (2004) argument that the standard deviation of managerial
ability can exceed that of fund returns. Finally, we use the calibration of Section 2 for the
parameters of the gambler’s fallacy, setting α = 0.2 and δ = 0.7. Table 2 reports Freddy’s
persistence estimate ρ˜, his trading volume relative to Tommy, and his relative value of
information.
σ2η/σ
2
ω 0.0004 0.001 0.0025 0.005 0.01
Persistence Estimate (ρ˜) 0.399 0.621 0.824 0.905 0.940
Rel. Volume (Q˜/Q) 1.728 1.834 1.635 1.254 0.916
Rel. Value Full Inf. (I˜∞/I∞) 0.238 0.450 0.774 0.921 0.966
Rel. Value 12-Month Inf. (I˜12/I12) 0.619 1.170 1.954 2.014 1.715
Rel. Value 6-Month Inf. (I˜6/I6) 1.104 2.049 2.754 2.197 1.648
Table 2: Freddy’s persistence estimate, relative volume, and relative value of information.
Consistent with Proposition 7, Freddy’s persistence estimate ρ˜ increases with the extent
of serial correlation, as measured by σ2η/σ
2
ω. Freddy’s trading volume exceeds Tommy’s by
more than 60% for the values of σ2η/σ
2
ω inferred by the data. For σ
2
η/σ
2
ω = 0.01 and larger
values, Freddy’s volume is below Tommy’s but never by more than 11%. The value of
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information that Freddy attributes to the full return history is below Tommy’s for all values
of σ2η/σ
2
ω in the table. This is especially so for smaller values because Freddy underestimates
significantly the information content of distant returns. But consistent with Proposition 10,
Freddy overestimates the content of recent returns. For all values of σ2η/σ
2
ω in the table, he
would overpay to learn the six-month history, and for all but the smallest value he would
overpay for the twelve-month history.
Imposing a prior belief that ρ˜ ≥ ρ > 0 would increase the ratios in the table. Suppose,
for example, that ρ = 0.6, i.e., Freddy is confident that at least 60% of managerial ability
in one month spills over to the next month. This would affect the column corresponding to
σ2η/σ
2
ω = 0.0004 since in that case Freddy converges to ρ˜ = 0.398 < 0.6. The new persistence
estimate becomes ρ˜ = 0.6, the relative volume jumps to 4.049, and the relative values of
information jump to 1.039, 2.703, and 4.749, respectively.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Our formulation of the recursive-filtering problem is as in standard
textbooks. For example, (9) and (10) follow from (4.1.1) and (4.1.4) in Balakrishnan (1987)
if xn+1 is replaced by xt, xn by xt−1, An by A˜, Un by 0, N sn by wt, vn by st − µ˜, Cn by C˜,
and N0n by vt. Eq. (11) follows from (4.6.14), if the latter is written for n + 1 instead of n,
and xn+1 is replaced by xt, xn by xt−1, and AKn + Qn by G˜t. That G˜t so defined is given
by (13), follows from (4.1.29) and (4.6.12) if Hn−1 is replaced by Σ˜t−1, GnG′n by V˜ , and Jn
by U˜ . Eq. (12) follows from (4.6.18) if the latter is written for n + 1 instead of n, Pn is
substituted from (4.1.30), and FnF
′
n is replaced by W˜ .
Proof of Proposition 2: It suffices to show (Balakrishnan, p.182-184) that the eigenvalues
of A˜− U˜ V˜ −1C˜ have modulus smaller than one. This matrix is σ˜2ωσ˜2η+σ˜2ω ρ˜ σ˜2ησ˜2η+σ˜2ωαρ˜
− σ˜2ω
σ˜2η+σ˜
2
ω
ρ˜ δρ˜ − σ˜
2
η
σ˜2η+σ˜
2
ω
αρ˜
 .
The characteristic polynomial is
λ2 − λ
[
σ˜2ω
σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
ρ˜+ δρ˜ −
σ˜2η
σ˜2η + σ˜
2
η
αρ˜
]
+
σ˜2ω
σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
ρ˜δρ˜
≡ λ2 − λb+ c
Suppose that the roots λ1, λ2 of this polynomial are real, in which case λ1 + λ2 = b and
λ1λ2 = c. Since c > 0, λ1 and λ2 have the same sign. If λ1 and λ2 are negative, they are
both greater than -1, since b > −1 from αρ˜ < 1 and ρ˜, δρ˜ ≥ 0. If λ1 and λ2 are positive,
then at least one is smaller than 1, since b < 2 from ρ˜, δρ˜ < 1 and αρ˜ ≥ 0. But since the
characteristic polynomial for λ = 1 takes the value
(1− δρ˜)
(
1− σ˜
2
ω
σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
ρ˜
)
+
σ˜2η
σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
αρ˜ > 0,
both λ1 and λ2 are smaller than 1. Suppose instead that λ1, λ2 are complex. In that case,
they are conjugates and the modulus of each is
√
c < 1.
Lemma A.1 determines st, the true mean of st conditional on Ht−1, and st(p˜), the mean
that Freddy computes under the parameter vector p˜. To state the lemma, we define the
37
matrices D˜t ≡ A˜− G˜tC˜, D˜ ≡ A˜− G˜C˜, and
J˜t,t′ ≡
{∏t
k=t′ D˜k for t
′ = 1, .., t,
I for t′ > t.
For simplicity, we set the initial condition x0 = 0.
Lemma A.1 The true mean st is given by
st = µ+
t−1∑
t′=1
CAt−t
′−1Gt′ζt′ (A.1)
and Freddy’s mean st(p˜) by
st(p˜) = µ˜+
t−1∑
t′=1
C˜M˜t,t′ζt′ + C˜M˜
µ
t (µ− µ˜), (A.2)
where
M˜t,t′ ≡ J˜t−1,t′+1G˜t′ +
t−1∑
k=t′+1
J˜t−1,k+1G˜kCAk−t
′−1Gt′ ,
M˜µt ≡
t−1∑
t′=1
J˜t−1,t′+1G˜t′ .
Proof: Consider the recursive-filtering problem under the true model, and denote by xt the
true mean of xt. Eq. (10) implies that
st = µ+ Cxt−1. (A.3)
Eq. (11) then implies that
xt = Axt−1 +Gt(st − st) = Axt−1 +Gtζt.
Iterating between t− 1 and zero, we find
xt−1 =
t−1∑
t′=1
At−t
′−1Gt′ζt′ . (A.4)
Plugging into (A.3), we find (A.1).
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Consider next Freddy’s recursive-filtering problem under p˜. Eq. (11) implies that
xt(p˜) = (A˜− G˜tC˜)xt−1(p˜) + G˜t(st − µ˜).
Iterating between t− 1 and zero, we find
xt−1(p˜) =
t−1∑
t′=1
J˜t−1,t′+1G˜t′(st′ − µ˜) (A.5)
=
t−1∑
t′=1
J˜t−1,t′+1G˜t′(ζt′ + µ− µ˜+ Cxt′−1),
where the second step follows from st′ = ζt′ + st′ and (A.3). Substituting xt′−1 from (A.4),
and grouping terms, we find
xt−1(p˜) =
t−1∑
t′=1
M˜t,t′ζt′ + M˜
µ
t (µ− µ˜). (A.6)
Combining this with
st(p˜) = µ˜+ C˜xt−1(p˜) (A.7)
(which follows from (10)), we find (A.2).
We next prove Lemma 3. While this Lemma is stated after Theorem 1 and Lemmas 1
and 2, its proof does not rely on these results.
Proof of Lemma 3: Lemma A.1 implies that
st(p˜)− st =
t−1∑
t′=1
et,t′ζt′ +N
µ
t (µ˜− µ), (A.8)
where
et,t′ ≡ C˜M˜t,t′ − CAt−t′−1Gt′ ,
Nµt ≡ 1− C˜M˜µt .
Therefore,
[st(p)− st]2 =
t−1∑
t′,t′′=1
et,t′et,t′′ζt′ζt′′ + (N
µ
t )
2(µ˜− µ)2 + 2
t−1∑
t′=1
et,t′N
µ
t ζt′(µ˜− µ). (A.9)
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Since the sequence {ζt′}t′=1,..,t−1 is independent under the true measure and mean-zero, we
have
E [st(p)− st]2 =
t−1∑
t′=1
e2t,t′σ
2
s,t′ + (N
µ
t )
2(µ˜− µ)2. (A.10)
We first determine the limit of
∑t−1
t′=1 e
2
t,t′σ
2
s,t′ when t goes to ∞. Defining the double
sequence {φk,t}k,t≥1 by
φk,t ≡
{
e2t,t−kσ
2
s,t−k for k = 1, .., t− 1,
0 for k > t− 1,
we have
t−1∑
t′=1
e2t,t′σ
2
s,t′ =
t−1∑
k=1
e2t,t−kσ
2
s,t−k =
∞∑
k=1
φk,t.
The definitions of et,t′ and M˜t,t′ imply that
et,t−k = C˜J˜t−1,t−k+1G˜t−k +
k−1∑
k′=1
C˜J˜t−1,t−k+k′+1G˜t−k+k′CAk
′−1Gt−k − CAk−1Gt−k. (A.11)
Eq. (10) applied to the recursive-filtering problem under the true model implies that
σ2s,t = CΣt−1C
′ + V.
When t goes to ∞, Gt goes to G, G˜t to G˜, Σt to Σ, and J˜t,t−k to D˜k+1. Therefore,
lim
t→∞
et,t−k = C˜D˜k−1G˜+
k−1∑
k′=1
C˜D˜k−1−k
′
G˜CAk
′−1G− CAk−1G = N˜k −Nk ≡ ek,
lim
t→∞
σ2s,t−k = CΣC
′ + V = CΣC ′ + σ2η + σ
2
ω = σ
2
s , (A.12)
implying that
lim
t→∞
φk,t = e
2
kσ
2
s .
The dominated convergence theorem will imply that
lim
t→∞
∞∑
k=1
φk,t =
∞∑
k=1
lim
t→∞
φk,t = σ
2
s
∞∑
k=1
e2k, (A.13)
if there exists a sequence {φk}k≥1 such that
∑∞
k=1 φk <∞ and |φk,t| ≤ φk for all k, t ≥ 1. To
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construct such a sequence, we note that the eigenvalues of A have modulus smaller than one,
and so do the eigenvalues of D˜ ≡ A˜− G˜C˜ (Balakrishnan, Theorem 4.2.3, p.111). Denoting
by a < 1 a number exceeding the maximum of the moduli, we can construct a dominating
sequence {φk}k≥1 decaying geometrically at the rate a2k.
We next determine the limit of Nµt . Defining the double sequence {χk,t}k,t≥1 by
χk,t ≡
{
J˜t−1,t−k+1G˜t−k for k = 1, .., t− 1,
0 for k > t− 1,
we have
Nµt = 1− C˜
t−1∑
k=1
J˜t−1,t−k+1G˜t−k = 1− C˜
∞∑
k=1
χk,t.
It is easy to check that the dominated convergence theorem applies to {χk,t}k,t≥1, and thus
lim
t→∞
Nµt = 1− C˜ lim
t→∞
[ ∞∑
k=1
χk,t
]
= 1− C˜
∞∑
k=1
lim
t→∞
χk,t = 1− C˜
∞∑
k=1
D˜k−1G˜ = Nµ. (A.14)
The lemma follows by combining (A.10), (A.13), and (A.14).
Proof of Theorem 1: Eq. (16) implies that
2 logLt(Ht|p˜)
t
= −
∑t
t′=1 log
[
2piσ2s,t′(p˜)
]
t
− 1
t
t∑
t′=1
[st′ − st′(p˜)]2
σ2s,t′(p˜)
. (A.15)
To determine the limit of the first term, we note that (10) applied to Freddy’s recursive-
filtering problem under p˜ implies that
σ2s,t(p˜) = C˜Σ˜t−1C˜
′ + V˜ .
Therefore,
lim
t→∞
σ2s,t(p˜) = C˜Σ˜C˜
′ + V˜ = σ2s(p˜), (A.16)
lim
t→∞
∑t
t′=1 log σ
2
s,t′(p˜)
t
= lim
t→∞
log σ2s,t(p˜) = log σ
2
s(p˜). (A.17)
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We next fix k ≥ 0 and determine the limit of the sequence
Sk,t ≡ 1
t
t∑
t′=1
ζt′ζt′+k
when t goes to ∞. This sequence involves averages of random variables that are non-
independent and non-identically distributed. An appropriate law of large numbers (LLN)
for such sequences is that of McLeish (1975). Consider a probability space (Ω,F , P ), a
sequence {Ft}t∈Z of σ-algebras, and a sequence {Ut}t≥1 of random variables. The pair
({Ft}t∈Z, {Ut}t≥1) is a mixingale (McLeish, Definition 1.2, p.830) if and only if there exist
sequences {ct}t≥1 and {ψm}m≥0 of nonnegative constants, with limm→∞ ψm = 0, such that
for all t ≥ 1 and m ≥ 0:
‖Et−mUt‖2 ≤ ψmct, (A.18)
‖Ut − Et+mUt‖2 ≤ ψm+1ct, (A.19)
where ‖.‖2 denotes the L2 norm, and Et′Ut the expectation of Ut conditional on Ft′ . McLeish’s
LLN (Corollary 1.9, p.832) states that if ({Ft}t∈Z, {Ut}t≥1) is a mixingale, then
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
Ut′ = 0
almost surely, provided that
∑∞
t=1 c
2
t/t
2 < ∞ and ∑∞m=1 ψm < ∞. In our model, we take
the probability measure to be the true measure, and define the sequence {Ft}t∈Z as follows:
Ft = {Ω, ∅} for t ≤ 0, and Ft is the σ-algebra generated by {ζt′}t′=1,..,t for t ≥ 1. Moreover,
we set Ut ≡ ζ2t − σ2s,t when k = 0, and Ut ≡ ζtζt+k when k ≥ 1. Since the sequence {ζt}t≥1
is independent, we have Et−mUt = 0 for m ≥ 1. We also trivially have Et+mUt = Ut for
m ≥ k. Therefore, when k = 0, (A.18) and (A.19) hold with ψ0 = 1, ψm = 0 for m ≥ 1, and
ct = supt≥1 ‖ζ2t − σ2s,t‖2 for t ≥ 1. McLeish’s LLN implies that
lim
t→∞
S0,t = lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
(
Ut′ + σ
2
s,t′
)
= lim
t→∞
∑t
t′=1 σ
2
s,t′
t
= lim
t→∞
σ2s,t = σ
2
s (A.20)
almost surely. When k ≥ 1, (A.18) and (A.19) hold with ψm = 1 for m = 0, .., k− 1, ψm = 0
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for m ≥ k, and ct = supt≥1 ‖ζt‖22 for t ≥ 1. McLeish’s LLN implies that
lim
t→∞
Sk,t = lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
Ut′ = 0 (A.21)
almost surely. Finally, a straightforward application of McLeish’s LLN to the sequence
Ut ≡ ζt implies that
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
ζt′ = 0 (A.22)
almost surely. Since N is countable, we can assume that (A.20), (A.21) for all k ≥ 1, and
(A.22), hold in the same measure-one set. In what follows, we consider histories in that set.
To determine the limit of the second term in (A.15), we write it as
1
t
t∑
t′=1
ζ2t′
σ2s,t′(p˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt
− 2
t
t∑
t′=1
ζt′ [st′(p˜)− st′ ]
σ2s,t′(p˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Yt
+
1
t
t∑
t′=1
[st′(p˜)− st′ ]2
σ2s,t′(p˜)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Zt
.
Since limt→∞ σ2s,t(p˜) = σ
2
s(p˜), we have
lim
t→∞
Xt =
1
σ2s(p˜)
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
ζ2t′ =
1
σ2s(p˜)
lim
t→∞
S0,t =
σ2s
σ2s(p˜)
. (A.23)
Using (A.8), we can write Yt as
Yt = 2
∞∑
k=1
ψk,t +
2
t
t∑
t′=1
Nµt′
σ2s,t′(p˜)
ζt′(µ˜− µ),
where the double sequence {ψk,t}k,t≥1 is defined by
ψk,t ≡
{
1
t
∑t
t′=k+1
et′,t′−k
σ2
s,t′ (p˜)
ζt′ζt′−k for k = 1, .., t− 1,
0 for k > t− 1.
Since limt→∞ et,t−k = ek and limt→∞N
µ
t = N
µ, we have
lim
t→∞
ψk,t =
ek
σ2s(p˜)
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=k+1
ζt′ζt′−k =
ek
σ2s(p˜)
lim
t→∞
Sk,t = 0,
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lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
Nµt′
σ2s,t′(p˜)
ζt′(µ˜− µ) = N
µ
σ2s(p˜)
(µ˜− µ) lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
t′=1
ζt′ = 0.
The dominated convergence theorem will imply that
lim
t→∞
Yt = 2 lim
t→∞
∞∑
k=1
ψk,t = 2
∞∑
k=1
lim
t→∞
ψk,t = 0 (A.24)
if there exists a sequence {ψk}k≥1 such that
∑∞
k=1 ψk < ∞ and |ψk,t| ≤ ψk for all k, t ≥ 1.
Such a sequence can be constructed by the same argument as for φk,t (Lemma 3) since
∣∣∣∣∣1t
t∑
t′=k+1
ζt′ζt′−k
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1t
t∑
t′=k+1
|ζt′| |ζt′−k| ≤
√√√√1
t
t∑
t′=k+1
ζ2t′
√√√√1
t
t∑
t′=k+1
ζ2t′−k ≤ sup
t≥1
S0,t <∞,
where the last inequality holds because the sequence S0,t is convergent.
Using similar arguments as for Yt, we find
lim
t→∞
Zt =
σ2s
σ2s(p˜)
∞∑
k=1
e2k +
(Nµ)2
σ2s(p˜)
(µ˜− µ)2 = e(p˜)
σ2s(p˜)
. (A.25)
The theorem follows from (A.15), (A.17), (A.23), (A.24), and (A.25).
Proof of Lemma 1: We first show that the set m(P ) is non-empty. Denoting by µ˜0 the
value that minimizes (µ˜− µ)2 over the closed set Pµ, we have
F (p˜) ≤ F (σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜2ω, µ˜0) ≡ G(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜2ω).
When (σ˜2η, σ˜
2
ω) go to zero, the covariance matrix Σ˜ goes to zero. (Σ˜ is smaller than the
covariance matrix when signals are not observable, and the latter matrix goes to zero.) Eq.
(A.16) then implies that σ2s(p˜) goes to zero. Eq. (A.16) also implies that when σ˜
2
η or σ˜
2
ω go
to∞, σ2s(p˜) goes to∞. In both cases, (17) implies that G(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜2ω) goes to −∞. Therefore,
in maximizing G(σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω) over the closed set Pσ,ρ, we can restrict ourselves to a compact
subset in which (σ˜2η, σ˜
2
ω) are not both zero. Since the function G(σ˜
2
η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω) is continuous in
such a subset, the set of its maximands is non-empty. The same is true for the set m(P ) of
maximands of F (p˜).
To show that the measure pit converges weakly to a measure giving weight only to m(P ),
it suffices to show that for all closed sets S that have zero intersection with m(P ), pit(S) goes
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to zero. (Billingsley, Theorem 29.1, p.390) Consider first the case where S is bounded. Since
S is compact, the maximum FS of F (p˜) over S is smaller than the value of F (p˜) in m(P ).
Consider a compact neighborhood B of a point in m(P ) such that the minimum FB of F (p˜)
over B exceeds FS. Consider also two constants (F1, F2) such that FB > F2 > F1 > FS. For
large enough t,
min
p˜∈B
logLt(Ht|p˜)
t
> F2. (A.26)
Indeed, if (A.26) does not hold, there exists a convergent sequence {p˜t}t≥1 in B such that
logLt(Ht|p˜t)
t
≤ F2.
Denoting the limit of this sequence by p˜ ∈ B, Theorem 1 implies that F (p˜) ≤ F2, a contra-
diction. (Theorem 1 concerns the convergence of the likelihood for a given p˜, but extending
the argument to a convergent sequence {p˜t}t≥1 is straightforward.) Likewise, we can show
that for large enough t,
max
p˜∈S
logLt(Ht|p˜)
t
< F1. (A.27)
Bayes’ law, (A.26), and (A.27) imply that for large enough t,
pit(S) =
Epi0
[
Lt(Ht|p˜)1{p˜∈S}
]
Epi0 [Lt(Ht|p˜)]
<
Epi0
[
Lt(Ht|p˜)1{p˜∈S}
]
Epi0
[
Lt(Ht|p˜)1{p˜∈B}
] < exp(tF1)pi0(S)
exp(tF2)pi0(B)
.
Since F2 > F1, pit(S) goes to zero when t goes to∞. When S is unbounded, we can consider
an increasing sequence of bounded subsets.
Proof of Lemma 2: Consider p˜ ∈ P such that e(p˜) = e(P ) and σ2s(p˜) = σ2s + e(p˜). We will
show that F (p˜) ≥ F (pˆ) for any pˆ = (σˆ2η, ρˆ, σˆ2ω, µˆ) ∈ P . Denote by Σˆ and Gˆ the steady-state
variance and regression coefficient for the recursive-filtering problem under pˆ, and by Σˆλ and
Gˆλ those under pˆλ ≡ (λσˆ2η, ρˆ, λσˆ2ω, µˆ) for λ > 0. It is easy to check that λΣˆ solves Equation
(14) for pˆλ. Since this equation has a unique solution, Σˆλ = λΣˆ. Equation (13) then implies
that Gˆλ = Gˆ, and Equations (18) and (A.16) imply that e(pˆλ) = e(pˆ) and σ
2
s(pˆλ) = λσ
2
s(pˆ).
Therefore,
F (pˆλ) = −1
2
[
log
[
2piλσ2s(pˆ)
]
+
σ2s + e(pˆ)
λσ2s(pˆ)
]
. (A.28)
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Since this function is maximized for
λ∗ =
σ2s + e(pˆ)
σ2s(pˆ)
,
we have
F (pˆ) ≤ F (pˆλ∗) = −1
2
[
log
[
2pi
[
σ2s + e(pˆ)
]]
+ 1
] ≤ −1
2
[
log
[
2pi
[
σ2s + e(p˜)
]]
+ 1
]
= F (p˜).
The proof of the converse is along the same lines.
Lemma A.2 determines when a model can predict the signals equally well as the true
model.
Lemma A.2 The error e(p˜) is zero if and only if
• C˜A˜k−1G˜ = CAk−1G for all k ≥ 1
• (1− ρ˜)(µ˜− µ) = 0.
Proof: From Lemma 3 it suffices to show that {ek}k≥1 = 0 is equivalent to C˜A˜k−1G˜ =
CAk−1G for all k ≥ 1, and Nµ(µ˜ − µ) = 0 is equivalent to (1 − ρ˜)(µ˜ − µ) = 0. Setting
ak ≡ C˜A˜k−1G˜− CAk−1G and
bk ≡ D˜k−1G˜+
k−1∑
k′=1
D˜k−1−k
′
G˜CAk
′−1G− A˜k−1G˜,
we have ek = C˜bk + ak for k ≥ 1. Simple algebra shows that
bk = D˜bk−1 − G˜ak−1.
Iterating between k and one, and using the initial condition b1 = 0, we find
bk = −
k−1∑
k′=1
D˜k−1−k
′
G˜ak′ .
Therefore,
ek = −
k−1∑
k′=1
C˜D˜k−1−k
′
G˜ak′ + ak. (A.29)
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Eq. (A.29) implies that {ek}k≥1 = 0 if and only if {ak}k≥1 = 0.
Eq. (21) implies that
Nµ = 1− C˜(I − D˜)−1G˜ = 1− C˜(I − A˜+ G˜C˜)−1G˜.
Replacing A˜ and C˜ by their values, and denoting the components of G˜ by G˜1 and G˜2, we
find
Nµ = 1− C˜(I − A˜+ G˜C˜)−1G˜ = (1− ρ˜)(1− δρ˜ + αρ˜)
[1− ρ˜(1− G˜1)](1− δρ˜ + αρ˜)− αρ˜(1− ρ˜)G˜2
. (A.30)
Since αρ˜, δρ˜ ∈ [0, 1), Nµ(µ˜− µ) = 0 is equivalent to (1− ρ˜)(µ˜− µ) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3: Tommy can achieve minimum error e(P0) = 0 by using the vector
of true parameters p. Since e(P0) = 0, Lemmas 2 and A.2 imply that p˜ ∈ m(P0) if and only
if (i) C˜A˜k−1G˜ = CAk−1G for all k ≥ 1, (ii) (1 − ρ˜)(µ˜ − µ) = 0, and (iii) σ2s(p˜) = σ2s . Since
α = 0 for Tommy, we can write Condition (i) as
ρ˜kG˜1 = ρ
kG1. (A.31)
We can also write element (1,1) of (14) as
Σ˜11 =
(ρ˜2Σ˜11 + σ˜
2
η)σ˜
2
ω
ρ˜2Σ˜11 + σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
, (A.32)
Σ11 =
(ρ2Σ11 + σ
2
η)σ
2
ω
ρ2Σ11 + σ2η + σ
2
ω
, (A.33)
and the first element of (15) as
G˜1 =
ρ˜2Σ˜11 + σ˜
2
η
ρ˜2Σ˜11 + σ˜2η + σ˜
2
ω
, (A.34)
G1 =
ρ2Σ11 + σ
2
η
ρ2Σ11 + σ2η + σ
2
ω
, (A.35)
where the first equation in each case is for p˜ and the second for p. Using (A.12) and (A.16),
we can write Condition (iii) as
ρ˜2Σ˜11 + σ˜
2
η + σ˜
2
ω = ρ
2Σ11 + σ
2
η + σ
2
ω. (A.36)
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Suppose that ρσ2η > 0, and consider p˜ that satisfies Conditions (i)-(iii). Eq. (A.35) implies
thatG1 > 0. Since (A.31) must hold for all k ≥ 1, we have ρ˜ = ρ and G˜1 = G1. We next write
(A.32)-(A.35) in terms of the normalized variables s˜2η ≡ σ˜2η/σ˜2ω, S˜11 ≡ Σ˜11/σ˜2ω, s2η ≡ σ2η/σ2ω,
and S11 ≡ Σ11/σ2ω. Eqs. (A.32) and (A.33) imply that S˜11 = g(s˜2η) and S11 = g(s2η) for the
same function g. Eqs. (A.34), (A.35), and G˜1 = G1 then imply that s˜
2
η = s
2
η, and (A.36)
implies that σ˜2ω = σ
2
ω. Since ρ˜ < 1, Condition (ii) implies that µ˜ = µ. Thus, p˜ = p.
Suppose next that ρσ2η = 0, and consider p˜ that satisfies Conditions (i)-(iii). If ρ = 0,
(A.31) implies that ρ˜kG˜1 = 0, and (A.36) that ρ˜
2Σ˜11 + σ˜
2
η + σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω. If σ
2
η = 0, the
same implications follow because Σ = 0 and G = [0, 1]′ from (14) and (15). Eq. ρ˜kG˜1 = 0
implies that either ρ˜ = 0, or G˜1 = 0 in which case σ˜
2
η = 0. If ρ˜ = 0, then σ˜
2
η + σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω
and µ˜ = µ. If σ˜2η = 0, then σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω, and if in addition ρ˜ < 1, then µ˜ = µ. Therefore, p˜
is as in the proposition. Showing that all p˜ in the proposition satisfy Conditions (i)-(iii) is
obvious.
Proof of Proposition 4: We determine the parameter vectors p˜ that belong to m(P0) and
satisfy e(p˜) = 0. From Lemmas 2 and A.2, these must satisfy (i) C˜A˜k−1G˜ = CAk−1G for all
k ≥ 1, (ii) (1 − ρ˜)(µ˜ − µ) = 0, and (iii) σ2s(p˜) = σ2s . Since ρσ2η = 0, we can write Condition
(i) as
ρ˜kG˜1 − αρ˜(δρ˜ − αρ˜)k−1G˜2 = 0, (A.37)
and Condition (iii) as
C˜Σ˜C˜ ′ + V˜ = σ2η + σ
2
ω. (A.38)
Using the definitions of (αρ˜, δρ˜), we can write (A.37) as
ρ˜k
[
G˜1 − α(δ − α)k−1G˜2
]
= 0. (A.39)
If ρ˜ 6= 0, (A.39) implies that G˜1 − α(δ − α)k−1G˜2 = 0 for all k ≥ 1, which in turn implies
that G˜ = 0. For G˜ = 0, (14) becomes Σ˜ = A˜Σ˜A˜′ + W˜ . Solving for Σ˜, we find
Σ˜11 =
σ˜2η
1− ρ˜2 ,
Σ˜12 = 0,
Σ˜22 =
σ˜2ω
1− (δρ˜ − αρ˜)2 .
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Substituting Σ˜ into (15), we find (σ˜2η, σ˜
2
ω) = 0. But then, Σ˜ = 0, which contradicts (A.38)
since σ2ω = σ
2
² > 0. Therefore, ρ˜ = 0. Eq. (A.38) then implies that σ˜
2
η + σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
η + σ
2
ω, and
Condition (ii) implies that µ˜ = µ. Showing that all p˜ in the proposition satisfy Conditions
(i)-(iii) is obvious.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider a sequence {αn}n∈N converging to zero, and an element
p˜n ≡ ((σ˜2η)n, ρ˜n, (σ˜2ω)n, µ˜n) from the set m(Pρ) corresponding to αn. The proposition will fol-
low if we show that (
(s˜2η)n
αn
, ρ˜n, (σ˜
2
ω)n, µ˜n) converges to (z, ρ, σ
2
ω, µ), where (s˜
2
η)n ≡ (σ˜2η)n/(σ˜2ω)n.
Denoting the limits of (
(s˜2η)n
αn
, (σ˜2η)n, ρ˜n, (σ˜
2
ω)n, µ˜n) by (`s, `η, `ρ, `ω, `µ), the point (`η, `ρ, `ω, `µ)
belongs to the set m(Pρ) derived for α = σ
2
η = 0. (If the sequences do not converge, we ex-
tract converging subsequences.) Since all elements in that set satisfy ρ˜ ≥ ρ > 0, Proposition
3 implies that they also satisfy σ˜2η = 0 and σ˜
2
ω = σ
2
ω. Therefore, `η = 0 and `ω = σ
2
ω.
We next determine (`s, `ρ, `µ) under the assumption `ρ < 1. When v ≡ (α, s˜
2
η
α
, σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜
2
ω)
converges to `v ≡ (0, `s, 0, `ρ, σ2ω), C˜D˜kG˜ converges to zero, G˜1s˜2η to
1
1−`2ρ , and G˜2 to 1. These
limits follow by continuity if we show that when α = σ˜2η = 0, C˜D˜
kG˜ = 0 and G˜2 = 1, and
when α = 0, limσ˜2η→0
G˜1
s˜2η
= 1
1−ρ˜2 . When σ˜
2
η = 0, the unique solution of (14) is Σ˜ = 0, and
(15) implies that G˜ = [0, 1]′. Therefore, when α = σ˜2η = 0, we have C˜G˜ = 0,
C˜D˜ = C˜(A˜− G˜C˜) = C˜A˜ = ρ˜C˜,
and C˜D˜kG˜ = ρ˜kC˜G˜ = 0. Moreover, if we divide both sides of (A.32) and (A.34) (derived
from (14) and (15) when α = 0) by σ˜2ω, we find
S˜11 =
(ρ˜2S˜11 + s˜
2
η)
ρ˜2S˜11 + s˜2η + 1
, (A.40)
G˜1 =
ρ˜2S˜11 + s˜
2
η
ρ˜2S˜11 + s˜2η + 1
. (A.41)
When σ˜2η converges to zero, s˜
2
η and S˜11 converge to zero. Eqs. (A.40) and (A.41) then imply
that S˜11
s˜2η
and G˜1
s˜2η
converge to 1
1−ρ˜2 .
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Using the above limits, we find
lim
v→`v
C˜A˜k−1G˜
α
= lim
v→`v
ρ˜kG˜1 − αρ˜(δρ˜ − αρ˜)k−1G˜2
α
= lim
v→`v
ρ˜k
[
s˜2η
α
G˜1
s˜2η
− (δ − α)k−1G˜2
]
= `kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
.
Eqs. (19), (A.29), limv→`v C˜D˜
kG˜ = 0, and Nk = CA
kG = 0, imply that
lim
v→`v
ek
α
= lim
v→`v
N˜k
α
= lim
v→`v
C˜D˜k−1G˜
α
= lim
v→`v
ak
α
= lim
v→`v
C˜A˜k−1G˜
α
= `kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
.
(A.42)
Since p˜n minimizes e(p˜n), (18) implies that ((σ
2
η)n, ρ˜n, (σ
2
ω)n) minimizes σ
2
s(p˜)
∑∞
k=0 e
2
k. Since
from (A.42),
lim
v→`v
σ2s(p˜)
∑∞
k=1 e
2
k
α2
= σ2ω
∞∑
k=1
`2kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)2
≡ σ2ωF (`s, `ρ),
(`s, `ρ) must minimize F . Treating F as a function of (`s/(1− `2ρ), `ρ), the minimizing value
of the second argument is clearly `ρ = ρ. The first-order condition w.r.t. the first argument
is ∞∑
k=1
`2kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
= 0,
and implies `s = z. Finally, `µ = µ since (`η, `ρ, `ω, `µ) belongs to the set m(Pρ) derived for
α = σ2η = 0, and `ρ < 1.
To show that `ρ cannot equal one, we proceed by contradiction. Denoting the limit of
(G˜1)n/αn by `G, and setting vˆ ≡ (α, G˜1α , σ˜2η, ρ˜, σ˜2ω) and `vˆ ≡ (0, `G, 0, 1, σ2ω), we have
lim
vˆ→`vˆ
σ2s(p˜)
∑∞
k=1 e
2
k
α2
= σ2ω
∞∑
k=1
(
`G − δk−1
)2
= σ2ω lim
`ρ→1
F
(
`G(1− `2ρ), `ρ
)
> σ2ωF (z, r),
a contradiction because p˜n minimizes e(p˜n).
Proof of Proposition 6: Eqs. (A.5) and (A.7) imply that in steady state
E˜t−1(st) ≡ st(p˜) = µ˜+
∞∑
k=1
C˜D˜k−1G˜(st−k − µ˜).
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Therefore,
k∑
k′=1
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂st−k′
=
k∑
k′=1
C˜D˜k
′−1G˜.
Eq. (A.42) implies that
k∑
k′=1
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂st−k′
= αgk + o(α),
where
gk ≡
k∑
k′=1
fk′ ,
fk ≡ ρk
(
z
1− ρ2 − δ
k−1
)
.
Using (25) to substitute z, we find
f1 = g1 =
ρ3(δ − 1)
1− ρ2δ < 0,
g∞ = ρ
[
z
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ) −
1
1− ρδ
]
=
ρ2(1− δ)
(1− ρ2δ)(1− ρδ) > 0.
The function fk is negative for k = 1 and positive for large k. Since it can change sign only
once, it is negative and then positive. The function gk is negative for k = 1, then decreases
(fk < 0), then increases (fk > 0), and is eventually positive (g∞ > 0). Therefore, gk is
negative and then positive.
Proof of Proposition 7: Consider a sequence {αn}n∈N converging to zero, an element
p˜n ≡ ((σ˜2η)n, ρ˜n, (σ˜2ω)n, µ˜n) from the set m(P0) corresponding to αn, and set (σ2η)n ≡ ναn.
The proposition will follow if we show that (
(s˜2η)n
αn
, ρ˜n, (σ˜
2
ω)n, µ˜n) converges to (z, r, σ
2
ω, µ).
Denoting the limits of (
(s˜2η)n
αn
, (σ˜2η)n, ρ˜n, (σ˜
2
ω)n, µ˜n) by (`s, `η, `ρ, `ω, `µ), the point (`η, `ρ, `ω, `µ)
belongs to the set m(P0) derived for α = σ
2
η = 0.
Suppose that `ρ ∈ (0, 1). Proposition 3 implies that `η = 0, `ω = σ2ω, and `µ = µ.
The same argument as in the proof of Proposition 5 implies that (`s, `ρ) must minimize the
function
H(`s, `ρ) ≡
∞∑
k=1
[
`kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
− ρk ν
1− ρ2
]2
.
Treating H as a function of (`ρ, `s/(1−`2ρ)), the first-order condition w.r.t. the first argument
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is ∞∑
k=1
`kρ
[
`kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
− ρk ν
1− ρ2
]
= 0 (A.43)
and w.r.t. the second is
∞∑
k=1
k`k−1ρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)[
`kρ
(
`s
1− `2ρ
− δk−1
)
− ρk ν
1− ρ2
]
= 0. (A.44)
Computing the infinite sums, we can write (A.43) as
`s`ρ
(1− `2ρ)2
− `ρ
1− `2ρδ
− νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρ) = 0 (A.45)
and (A.44) as
`s
1− `2ρ
[
`s`ρ
(1− `2ρ)3
− `ρ
(1− `2ρδ)2
− νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρ)2
]
−
[
`s`ρ
(1− `2ρ)(1− `2ρδ)2
− `ρ
(1− `2ρδ2)2
− νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρδ)2
]
= 0. (A.46)
Substituting `s from (A.45), we can write the first square bracket in (A.46) as
− νρ`ρ(ρ− `ρ)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρ)2(1− `2ρ)
+
`3ρ(1− δ)
(1− `2ρ)(1− `2ρδ)
and the second as
νρ`ρ(ρ− `ρ)
[
1− 2δ + (ρ+ `ρ)`ρδ2 − ρ`3ρδ2
]
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρ)(1− `2ρδ)2(1− ρ`ρδ)2
− `
3
ρ(1− δ)
[
1− 2δ + `2ρ(1 + δ)δ2 − `4ρδ3
]
(1− `2ρδ)3(1− `2ρδ2)2
.
We next substitute `s from (A.45) into the term
`s
1−`2ρ that multiplies the first square bracket
in (A.46). Grouping terms, we can write (A.46) as
− νρ(ρ− `ρ)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ`ρ)2H1(`ρ) +
`2ρ(1− δ)
(1− `2ρδ)2
H2(`ρ) = 0. (A.47)
Eq. (A.47) coincides with (27) when `ρ = r. To show that (A.47) has a solution, we note
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that H1(`ρ), H2(`ρ) > 0 for `ρ ∈ [0, 1] because
2− ρ`ρ(1 + δ)− `2ρδ + ρ2`4ρδ2 > 0, (A.48)
2− `2ρδ2 − `4ρδ3 > 0. (A.49)
(To show (A.48) and (A.49), we use ρ, δ < 1. For (A.48) we also note that the left-hand
side (LHS) is decreasing in δ and positive for δ = 1.) Since H1(`ρ), H2(`ρ) > 0, the LHS of
(A.47) is negative for `ρ = 0 and positive for `ρ = ρ. Therefore, there exists a solution `ρ = r
in (0, ρ). Moreover, there does not exist a solution in (ρ, 1] because the LHS is positive.
Substituting `ρ = r into (A.45), we find `s = z. The argument that `ρ 6= {0, 1} is along the
same lines as in the proof of Proposition 5.
Proof of Proposition 8: Proceeding as in the proof of Proposition 6, we find
k∑
k′=1
∂E˜t−1(st)
∂st−k′
−
k∑
k′=1
∂Et−1(st)
∂st−k′
= αgk + o(α),
where
gk ≡
k∑
k′=1
fk′ ,
fk ≡ rk
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k−1
)
− ρk ν
1− ρ2 . (A.50)
The proposition will follow if we show that f1 = g1 < 0 and g∞ < 0. Indeed, suppose
that f1 = g1 < 0. Since r < ρ, fk is negative for large k. Moreover, (A.43) can be written
for (`s, `ρ) = (z, r) as
∞∑
k=1
rkfk = 0, (A.51)
implying that fk has to be positive for some k. Since fk can change sign at most twice
(because the derivative of fk/ρ
k can change sign at most once, implying that fk/ρ
k can
change sign at most twice), it is negative, then positive, and then negative again.
The function gk is negative for k = 1, then decreases (fk < 0), then increases (fk > 0),
and then decreases again (fk < 0). If g∞ < 0, then gk can either be (i) always negative or
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(ii) negative, then positive, and then negative again. To rule out (i), we write (A.51) as
g1r +
∞∑
k=2
(gk − gk−1) rk = 0⇔
∞∑
k=1
gk
(
rk − rk+1) = 0.
We next show that f1 = g1 < 0 and g∞ < 0. Substituting z from (26), we find
f1 = g1 =
zr
1− r2 − r −
νρ
1− ρ2 =
ρr(ρ− r)(ν − ν1)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr) ,
g∞ =
zr
(1− r2)(1− r) −
r
1− rδ −
νρ
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ) =
ρ(ρ− r)(ν∞ − ν)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr)(1− ρ) ,
where
ν1 ≡ (1− ρ
2)(1− ρr)r2(1− δ)
ρ(ρ− r)(1− r2δ)
ν∞ ≡ (1− ρ
2)(1− ρr)(1− ρ)r2(1− δ)
ρ(ρ− r)(1− r2δ)(1− rδ) .
We thus need to show that ν1 > ν > ν∞. These inequalities will follow if we show that when
ν is replaced by ν1 (resp. ν∞) in (27), the LHS becomes larger (resp. smaller) than the RHS.
To show these inequalities, we make use of 0 < r < ρ < 1 and 0 ≤ δ < 1. The inequality for
ν1 is
(ρ− rδ)r2
(ρ− r)(1− ρr)(1− r2δ) +
Y1
(1− ρr)(1− ρrδ)2(1− r2δ2)2(1− r2δ) > 0, (A.52)
where
Y1 = (1− r2δ2)2
[
2− ρr(1 + δ)− r2δ + ρ2r4δ2]− (1− ρr)(1− ρrδ)2(2− r2δ2 − r4δ3).
Since ρ > r > rδ, (A.52) holds if Y1 > 0. Algebraic manipulations show that Y1 = (ρ−rδ)rZ1,
where
Z1 ≡ (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)
[
δ(1− r2δ)(2− r2δ2 − ρrδ) + (1− ρrδ)2]
−(1− r2δ2)2 [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2] .
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Since 2− r2δ2 − r4δ3 > 2(1− r2δ2), inequality Z1 > 0 follows from
2
[
δ(1− r2δ)(2− r2δ2 − ρrδ) + (1− ρrδ)2]− (1− r2δ2) [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2] > 0. (A.53)
To show (A.53), we break the LHS into
2δ(1− r2δ)(1− r2δ2)− (1− r2δ2)(δ − r4δ3) = δ(1− r2δ2)(1− r2δ)2 > 0
and
2
[
δ(1− r2δ)(1− ρrδ) + (1− ρrδ)2]− (1− r2δ2)(1− ρr3δ2). (A.54)
Eq. (A.54) is positive because of the inequalities
2(1− ρrδ) > 1− r2δ2,
δ(1− r2δ) + 1− ρrδ > 1− ρr3δ2.
The inequality for ν∞ is
− (ρ− rδ)(1− ρ)(1− r)r
(ρ− r)(1− ρr)(1− r2δ)(1− rδ)2 +
Y∞
(1− ρr)(1− ρrδ)2(1− r2δ)(1− r2δ2)2(1− rδ) < 0,
(A.55)
where
Y∞ = (1−ρ)(1−r2δ2)
[
2− ρr(1 + δ)− r2δ + ρ2r4δ2]−(1−ρr)(1−ρrδ)2(1−rδ)(2−r2δ2−r4δ3).
Algebraic manipulations show that Y∞ = −(ρ− rδ)Z∞, where
Z∞ ≡ (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)
[
(1− ρrδ)2(1− r)− (1− ρ)rδ(1− r2δ)(2− r2δ2 − ρrδ)]
+(1− ρ)r(1− r2δ2)2 [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2] .
To show that Z∞ > 0, we break it into
(2− r2δ2 − r4δ3) [(1− ρrδ)2(1− r)− (1− ρ)rδ(1− r2δ)(1− ρrδ)]
> (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)(1− ρrδ) [(1− ρrδ)(1− r)− (1− ρ)(1− r2δ)]
= (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)(1− ρrδ)(ρ− r)(1− rδ) > 0
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and
(1− ρ)r(1− r2δ2)2 [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2]− (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)(1− ρ)rδ(1− r2δ)(1− r2δ2)
= (1− ρ)r(1− r2δ2) [(1− r2δ2) [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2]− (2− r2δ2 − r4δ3)δ(1− r2δ)] .
Since 2 − r2δ2 − r4δ3 < 2 − r2δ2 − r4δ4 = (1 − r2δ2)(2 + r2δ2), the last square bracket is
greater than
(1− r2δ2) [1 + δ − (ρ+ rδ)r3δ2 − δ(1− r2δ)(2 + r2δ2)]
= (1− r2δ2) [(1− δ)(1− r4δ3) + r2δ2(2− δ − ρr)] > 0.
Proof of Proposition 9: Eqs. (A.6) and (A.7) imply that in steady state
E˜t−1(st) ≡ st(p˜) =
∞∑
k=1
N˜kζt−k + µ˜+
∞∑
k=1
C˜D˜k−1G˜(µ− µ˜).
Therefore,
E˜t(st+1)− E˜t−1(st) =
∞∑
k=1
(N˜k − N˜k−1)ζt−k,
where N˜0 ≡ 0. Since the sequence {ζt}t∈Z is i.i.d. and normal with mean zero and variance σ2s ,
the variable E˜t(st+1)−E˜t−1(st) is normal with mean zero and variance σ2s
∑∞
k=1(N˜k−N˜k−1)2.
Eq. (31) then follows from (30) and the fact that for a normal variable γ with mean zero
and variance σ2, E(|γ|) =
√
2
pi
σ .
Suppose that σ2η = 0 and Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ ≥ ρ for ρ ∈ (0, ρ]. Since
Nk = 0 for all k ≥ 1, (31) implies that Q = 0. To show that Q˜ > 0, suppose instead that
Q˜ = 0. Eq. (31) then implies that N˜k = 0 for all k ≥ 1, Lemma A.2 implies that C˜A˜k−1G˜ = 0
for all k ≥ 1, and Proposition 4 implies that ρ˜ = 0, a contradiction.
Suppose next that ρ > 0 and Freddy has no prior knowledge. Eq. (A.42) implies that
N˜k − N˜k−1 = αhk + o(α),
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where
h˜k ≡ rk
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k−1
)
− rk−1
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k−2
)
= −rk−1
[
z(1− r)
1− r2 − δ
k−2(1− rδ)
]
for k ≥ 2, and
h˜1 ≡ r
(
z
1− r2 − 1
)
.
Substituting into (31), we find
Q˜ =
√
2
pi
α
aσs
√√√√ ∞∑
k=1
h˜2k + o(α).
The same equation holds for Tommy by omitting the tildes and setting
hk ≡ ρk ν
1− ρ2 − ρ
k−1 ν
1− ρ2 = −ρ
k−1 ν
1 + ρ
for k ≥ 2, and
h1 ≡ ρ ν
1− ρ2 .
Therefore, for small α and σ2η, inequality Q˜ > Q is equivalent to
∞∑
k=1
h˜2k >
∞∑
k=1
h2k
⇔ z
2r2
(1− r2)2(1 + r) +
r2
1 + rδ
− zr
2(2− r − rδ)
(1− r2)(1− r2δ) >
ν2ρ2
(1− ρ2)2(1 + ρ) . (A.56)
Substituting z from (26) and grouping terms in ν2, ν, and 1, we can write (A.56) as RQ > 0
where
RQ ≡ ν
2ρ2(ρ− r)(1 + r − r2 − ρr2)
(1− ρ2)2(1− ρr)2(1 + ρ) −
νρr2(1− r2)(1− δ)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρr)(1− r2δ) +
r4(1− δ)2
(1− r2δ)2(1 + rδ) .
(A.57)
When ν is small, (27) implies that
r ≈
√
νρ2
(1− ρ2)(1− δ) . (A.58)
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Substituting into (A.57), we find
RQ ≈ ν
2ρ5
(1− ρ2)2(1 + ρ) > 0.
When ν is large, (27) implies that r ≈ ρ and
ρ− r ≈ ρ(1− ρ
2)3(1− δ)
ν(1− ρ2δ)2 . (A.59)
Substituting into (A.57), we find
RQ ≈ − νρ
5(1− δ)2
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ2δ)2 < 0.
Therefore, Q˜ > Q for small ν, and Q˜ < Q for large ν.
Proof of Proposition 10: The maximum in (28) is
U˜1(W˜t−1, E˜t−1(st)) = − exp
[
−a(1 + r)W˜t−1 − (E˜t−1(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ar1
]
(A.60)
and the maximum when Freddy observes signals up to Period t− k only is
U˜k(W˜t−1, E˜t−k(st)) = − exp
[
−a(1 + r)W˜t−1 − (E˜t−k(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ark
]
. (A.61)
Eqs. (32), (A.60), and (A.61) imply that
exp
[
a(1 + r)I˜k
]
E˜t−k−1
{
exp
[
−(E˜t−1(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ar1
]}
= exp
[
−(E˜t−k−1(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ark+1
]
. (A.62)
To compute the expectation in (A.62), we write the term inside the square bracket as −γ2
2
,
where
γ ≡ E˜t−1(st)− r√
V˜ ar1
.
When Freddy observes signals up to Period t− k − 1, he takes γ to be normal with mean
µγ ≡ E˜t−k−1(st)− r√
V˜ ar1
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and variance
σ2 ≡ V˜ art−k−1(E˜t−1(st))
V˜ ar1
=
V˜ art−k−1(st)− E˜t−k−1(V˜ art−1(st))
V˜ ar1
=
V˜ ark+1 − V˜ ar1
V˜ ar1
. (A.63)
Since for a normal variable γ with mean µγ and variance σ
2,
E exp
(
−γ
2
2
)
=
1√
1 + σ2
exp
(
− µ
2
γ
2(1 + σ2)
)
,
we have
E˜t−k−1
{
exp
[
−(E˜t−1(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ar1
]}
=
√
V˜ ar1
V˜ ark+1
exp
[
−(E˜t−k−1(st)− r)
2
2V˜ ark+1
]
.
Substituting into (A.62), we find the first equality in (33). To derive the second equality, we
note from (A.63) that
V˜ ark+1 = V˜ ar1 + V˜ art−k−1(E˜t−1(st)). (A.64)
We next define the sequence {ζ˜t}t∈Z of surprises according to Freddy by ζ˜t ≡ st − E˜t−1(st).
Same calculations as for Tommy in Lemma A.1 imply that in steady state
E˜t−1(st) =
∞∑
k=1
C˜A˜k−1G˜ζ˜t−k.
Therefore,
V˜ art−k−1(E˜t−1(st)) = V˜ art−k−1
(
k∑
k′=1
C˜A˜k
′−1G˜ζ˜t−k′
)
=
k∑
k′=1
(C˜A˜k−1G˜)2V˜ ar1, (A.65)
where the last step is because Freddy views the sequence {ζ˜t}t∈Z as i.i.d. with variance
V˜ ar1 = σ
2
s(p˜). Combining (A.64) and (A.65) establishes the second inequality in (33).
Suppose that σ2η = 0 and Freddy has prior knowledge that ρ˜ ≥ ρ for ρ ∈ (0, ρ]. Since
Nk = 0 for all k ≥ 1, (33) implies that Ik = 0 for all k ≥ 1. To show that I˜k > 0 for all
k ≥ 2, it suffices to show that I˜2 > 0. If I˜2 = 0, then C˜G˜ = 0 and C˜A˜G˜ = 0. Proceeding as
in the proof of Proposition 4, we can show that ρ˜ = 0, a contradiction.
Suppose next that ρ > 0 and Freddy has no prior knowledge. Eqs. (33) and (A.42) imply
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that
I˜k =
α2
2a(1 + r)
k∑
k′=1
r2k
′
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k′−1
)2
+ o(α2). (A.66)
Likewise,
Ik =
α2
2a(1 + r)
k∑
k′=1
ρ2k
′ ν2
(1− ρ2)2 + o(α
2). (A.67)
Therefore, for small α and σ2η,
I˜k > Ik ⇔
k∑
k′=1
[
rk
′
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k′−1
)
+ ρk
′ ν
1− ρ2
]
fk′ > 0, (A.68)
for fk defined in (A.50). Recall from Proposition 8 that fk is negative in an interval k ∈
{1, .., k0−1}, becomes positive in an interval k ∈ {k0, .., k1}, and becomes negative again for
k ∈ {k1 + 1, ..}. Since fk < 0 in {k1 + 1, ..}, (A.51) implies that
k1∑
k=1
rkfk = −
∞∑
k=k1+1
rkfk > 0. (A.69)
Since fk < 0 in {1, .., k0}, fk > 0 in k ∈ {k0 + 1, .., k1}, and 0 < r < ρ,
k1∑
k=1
ρkfk = ρ
k0
k1∑
k=1
ρk−k0fk > ρk0
k1∑
k=1
rk−k0fk =
ρk0
rk0
k1∑
k=1
rkfk. (A.70)
Likewise, since 0 ≤ δ < 1,
k1∑
k=1
rkδk−1fk = δk0−1
k1∑
k=1
rkδk−k0fk < δk0−1
k1∑
k=1
rkfk. (A.71)
Eqs (A.68), (A.70), and (A.71) imply that I˜k1 > Ik1 if
1
rk0
[
rk0
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k0−1
)
+ ρk0
ν
1− ρ2
]( k1∑
k=1
rkfk
)
> 0.
This inequality holds because of (A.68) and
rk0
(
z
1− r2 − δ
k0−1
)
+ ρk0
ν
1− ρ2 = fk0 + 2ρ
k0
ν
1− ρ2 > 0.
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Computing the sums in (A.66) and (A.67), we find that I˜∞ > I∞ is equivalent to
z2r2
(1− r2)3 +
r2
1− r2δ2 −
2zr2
(1− r2)(1− r2δ) >
ν2ρ2
(1− ρ2)3 . (A.72)
Substituting z from (26) and grouping terms in ν2, ν, and 1, we can write (A.72) as RI > 0
where
RI ≡ − ν
2ρ2(ρ− r)2
(1− ρ2)3(1− ρr)2 +
r4(1− δ)2
(1− r2δ2)(1− r2δ)2 . (A.73)
To evaluate RI for small ν, we substitute (A.58) into (A.73) and find
RI ≈ − ν
2ρ6
(1− ρ2)3 < 0.
To evaluate RI for large ν, we substitute (A.59) into (A.73) and find
RI ≈ ρ
6(1− δ)4
(1− ρ2δ)4(1− ρ2δ2) > 0.
Therefore, I˜∞ < I∞ for small ν, and I˜∞ > I∞ for large ν.
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